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Summery 
This thesis examines what influence United Nations peacebuilding missions have on 
the sovereignty of fragile states in Africa. The starting point for the analysis is the 
nature of the fragile state and an examination of how the condition of fragility 
influences the presence of sovereignty in these states. The thesis distinguishes itself 
by recognising the relationship between the two entities and establishes an 
understanding of fragile stateʼs sovereignty as a tool for negotiation when it comes to 
international intervention. It is the argument of the thesis, that UN peacebuilding with 
its added dimension of statebuilding illustrates an added dimension to the 
understanding of sovereignty in fragile states. In the environment of UN 
peacebuilding interventions, sovereignty in fragile states becomes more than just an 
interaction with external donors, but becomes an informal arrangement of shared 
sovereignty.  
The thesis starts of by establishing a conceptualised understanding of the fragile 
state. This framework is used as the foundation for further analysis of sovereignty 
and for understanding the interventionist approach of UN peacebuilding missions. 
The conceptualisation of the fragile state is compiled by including perspectives from 
various authors on the functions and performance of the state and by including an 
understanding that the historical context is influential in the current condition of the 
fragile state.  
It is the argument of this thesis that the character of the fragile state is of paramount 
importance when establishing an understanding of the condition of sovereignty in 
these countries. The fragility of the state is understood to influence the stateʼs 
domestic and interdependence sovereignty to the point where they are virtually non-
existent. This in conjunction with the fact that fragile states are among the poorest 
countries in the world, sets the state in a position where international assistance is 
necessary in order to manage territory and gain access to external resources. 
This means that the fragile state has become a new kind of sovereign state that is 
independent in law, insubstantial in reality and hugely materially dependent on other 
states for general functions and welfare. In an international community where the 
fragile state has gained increased attention in recent years, the adverse 
circumstances of the fragile state and the very lack of domestic sovereignty have 
become instruments for attracting external resources. As such sovereignty and the 
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principle of non-intervention, have become entities for negotiation of the pace and 
scope of the external intervention and not indisputable principles of international 
relations. Sovereignty in fragile states can thus be seen as a matter of interaction 
rather than an absolute and indisputable fact of international relations. 
UN peacebuilding interventions should be seen in the light of the fact that the fragile 
state, in recent years, has become a centre of focus for international relations as 
international security has grown to be seen as interconnected. The fragile state is 
here seen, as the exemplification of the connection between security and 
development. In this thesis UN peacebuilding is seen as the extension of the 
international communityʼs, though primarily the Westʼs, project of ideology expansion. 
Furthermore, UN peacebuilding is seen as demonstrating a widening of traditional 
intervention areas. With its current focus on building state capacity, UN 
peacebuilding has moved into domestic policy areas and as demonstrating a degree 
of co-authorship over the national project of statebuilding. It is argued that the focus 
on building state capacity in conjunction with liberal demands of good governance 
and democratisation has been instrumental in moving the condition of sovereignty in 
fragile states from a condition of interaction to one of shared sovereignty.   
UN peacebuilding alongside the character of the fragile state can thus be seen as 
having influenced the structure of sovereignty in fragile states to the point that it has 
become a matter of shared sovereignty. As such UN peacebuilding is seen to 
influence sovereignty in fragile states beyond its already augmented form. In the 
short to medium-term this can be seen as decreasing the scope, latitude and policy 
options of the fragile state. However, if the peacebuilding project is successful and 
then withdrawn, it has the potential to increase domestic sovereignty areas over the 
long-term. 	  
  
	  
	   5	  
Introduction 
Field of research 
During the past decade, the so-called fragile states and questions of how best to 
engage with them have emerged as a key priority area in the international 
development community. This concern has surfaced as a result of several 
interconnected factors; a concern with the relationship between state effectiveness 
and development; an increase in focus on human security and peacebuilding; and 
the belief that lack of development and insecurity are related (Mcloughlin, 2012).  
This thesis examines the character of the fragile state and the international 
communityʼs engagement in them in order to determine how the condition of 
sovereignty has evolved in this environment. 
In this thesis, the fragile state serves as the point of departure and allows for a 
foundation to understand sovereignty and international intervention.  
Determining the number or nature of fragile states can be a difficult exercise, as 
many definitions and terms exist to explain the same phenomenon. However it can 
be pointed out that fragile states often are characterised by vast internal 
complexities, a lack of ability and/or willingness to manage resources responsibly 
and that they are often the centre of violent internal conflicts (either current or recent) 
(Stepputat and Eng-berg Pedersen, 2008).  
Rhetorically, the fragile state concept is often evoked by external actors in order to 
serve political interests motivated by geopolitical desires, to explain political unrest 
and the failure of the development project, or as justification for certain political 
actions. The fragile state is therefore often understood primarily in connection with 
global projects such as peacekeeping, the War Against Terror or the desire to make 
the world safe for capital (Harrison, 2009). In other words, the fragile state is often 
viewed from the outside and in conjunction with certain necessary actions that must 
be taken by the international community. The role of external actors is thus 
introduced. These countries therefore also often display a dependency on outside 
actors in the management of their territory, delivering services to their populace and 
upholding government institutions (Ibid).  
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United Nations (UN) peacebuilding interventions should be seen in relation to this 
and understood as representing the external actor in the fragile state. UN 
peacebuilding missions thus function as the extension of the international 
communityʼs motivation to intervene. It is therefore worth examining the incentive to 
intervene in fragile states and the way in which this is done.  
The motivation for peacebuilding initiatives can be found within the inherent 
understanding of the UN, and other liberal actors, that there is a connection between 
security and development, often called the security-development nexus (UNSG, 
1998, Andersen, 2008, Kerr, 2007). The security-development nexus views conflict 
as a hindrance for economic development, while simultaneously viewing lack of 
development as a root cause of conflict (Kerr, 2007). In order to foster development, 
conflict must therefore be prevented. It is therefore easy to see how the many 
intrastate conflicts in the developmental states of Africa can be seen as the very 
exemplification of the link between security and development (Andersen, 2005). 
What the nexus between security and development also implies is that the 
international society cannot isolate itself from the effects of poverty, instability and 
insecurity in the worldʼs poorest countries. To achieve national security, the 
governments of the worldʼs wealthier countries must therefore pursue development 
abroad (Duffield, 2001). The notion of the fragile state has, as a natural consequence 
of this theory, in recent years increasingly been linked to insecurity domestically, 
regionally and internationally.  
This means that intervention in fragile states is linked to notion that to achieve 
sustainable peace, the promotion of political, economic and social development is 
necessary. The well-functioning state is therefore often seen as a prerequisite for 
security both domestically and internationally (Paris, 2001, Rotberg, 2004). This 
notion lends itself to the discourse of the fragile state and the argument that it is an 
imperative of our time to help transform these states into responsible sovereign 
nations that contribute to the international order and global stability (UNSG, 1998:art. 
58). As a result the state has gained a renaissance as the preferred means for 
providing security, and donor countries and multinational organisations have 
therefore focused their efforts on promoting and building the functions of the state 
(Andersen, 2010).  
Theoretically the role of the outsider in the statebuilding project is to support internal 
processes of reform and reconstruction. However, it is widely acknowledged that 
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international engagement in post-conflict situations tends to be far more intrusive 
than that (Andersen, 2008). This becomes relevant in relation to this paper due to the 
choice to focus on peacebuilding, which is introduced in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict (DPKO, 2008, UNSG, 2009). Furthermore, the empirical date is collected 
from three countries, which are all currently on UNʼs Peacebuilding Agenda and thus 
are either emerging from, or are still to some degree characterised by conflict.1  
In this regard the field of sovereignty becomes an interesting phenomenon for 
examination, as it constitutes the area in-between the fragile state and the 
international community. This thesis thus attempts to examine the juxtaposition 
between the UNʼs peacebuilding intervention on one side and the sovereignty of the 
state in question on the other. By analysing how these coincide in the context of the 
states currently immersed in UN peacebuilding operations, the thesis seeks to 
explore sovereignty in the context of international engagement. The research 
question is therefore as follows: 
 
 
How do United Nations peacebuilding missions influence the sovereignty of 
fragile states in Africa?  
 
In order to be able to deliver an in-depth and nuanced discussion on how sovereignty 
in fragile states is affected by peacebuilding initiatives, it is relevant to first do an 
analysis of the character of the fragile state influence on the condition of sovereignty. 
With this in mind the sub-question becomes: 
-­‐ How does the character of the fragile state influence the condition of 
sovereignty in these states?  
The sub-question forms the backbone of the analysis and serves as a backdrop to 
understanding peacebuilding interventions and their influence on state sovereignty. 
Determining the nature of the fragile state thus becomes relevant for understanding 
state sovereignty in the context of fragility and later in relation to international 
intervention. In this paper I have subsequently chosen a state-centric orientation in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data selection will be described in greater detail below  
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my analysis of fragility and focused on the statesʼ capacity to provide resources for 
development and security for their populations. This provides a framework for 
understanding the sub-national, transnational and international factors, which gain 
significance due to their ability to either reinforce or undermine sovereignty.  
 
Delimitation 
The international community has many options to intervene in fragile situations in 
states in its arsenal: governance reforms, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian 
interventions, structural adjustment policies, political missions, and preventive 
diplomacy. Though many of these other options to intervene might be equally able to 
demonstrate aspects of sovereignty within the relationship between the fragile state 
and the international community, I have chosen to focus on UN peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding is, an interesting research area when it comes to fragile states due to 
the inherent understanding contained within the concept, that security and 
development are interlinked. As such the concept of peacebuilding presupposes a 
degree of statebuilding initiatives that sets it deeply within domestic policy areas and 
thus challenges conventional understandings of sovereignty. This is one of the main 
points of examination made in this thesis. 
The thesis is set within the field of sovereignty in the context of UN peacebuilding in 
fragile states in Africa. When analysing both the fragile state and peacebuilding, 
theories under the heading of security studies are often applied. In this thesis security 
will primarily be discussed using the theory of human security and in relation to state 
fragility. Human securityʼs point of departure is the understanding that humans 
should be the primary objects of protection (Kerr, 2007). Here it will primarily be used 
to illustrate the statesʼ (in)ability to perform some of the basic tasks of statehood such 
as monopoly of the legitimate use of force, control of territory and protection of 
civilians (Sørensen, 1998 and Jackson, 1990). This allows for a focus on how these 
practical applications of security might influence the condition of sovereignty in the 
states in question. The somewhat practical understanding of security as related to 
the survival and safety for individuals, is closely related to the theory of human 
security. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) first coined this 
concept in 1994 in its Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), and the concept 
has since made its way into common UN terminology and policy-making (Kerr, 2007). 
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In relation to peacebuilding, this focus provides an avenue for examining sovereignty 
in the interplay between the desire to provide security for the individual and 
simultaneously seeking to improve the statesʼ capacity to provide these services 
itself. Therefore, though there will be a short discussion as to the influence of the 
security-development nexus on the motivation and objectives of peacebuilding 
operations, and to clarify the connection between the two, there will not be a 
discussion on the different theoretical approaches to the concept of security in 
relation to the fragile state.  
Though there are many avenues that could be examined in relation to fragile states 
and international engagement, this thesis focuses on the current peacebuilding 
efforts of the United Nations. The rationale for doing this rests on the understanding 
that although the UN by no means is the only actor engaging in peacebuilding or 
similar activities, it is the largest. The UN also often plays a significant role in aiding 
countries in writing their Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding (UNPBC, 2007a, 
2007b, 2009a). Moreover, the UN often functions as a coordination body on the 
ground and therefore has vast influence on the activities and projects taking place 
outside its own purview (Andersen, 2007). It should be mentioned in relation to the 
focus on UN peacebuilding, that the thesis will not focus on determining the 
effectiveness or appropriateness of UN peacebuilding initiatives as such, but rather 
focus on determining the pattern of sovereignty in fragile states in the interplay of 
international engagement.  
It is precisely in relation to sovereignty, that the UN represents an interesting starting 
point for the discussion, as the organisational structure of the multinational 
organisation is built on the very respect of sovereignty (UN, 1945). Furthermore, it is 
an interesting side note to the issue that all the case countries are members of the 
very organisation performing the intervention. The latter will not to a large degree be 
elaborated on further in the paper, but serves to illustrate that the fragile states in 
question are legally recognised as sovereign states.  
The focus on the UN as the external actor in the international intervention, as 
opposed to other multilateral organisations or even bilateral arrangements, allows for 
a nuanced exploration of state sovereignty in relation to the fragile state.  
Whereas peacebuilding within the UN context started out as an idealistic concept 
with democratisation as one of its focus points (UNSG, 1992 and UNSG, 1998), the 
UN today focuses more intently on building national capacity (UNSG, 2009). The 
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evolution of peacebuilding within the UN will be elaborated on at a later stage, 
however, this demonstrates a shift in perception, which I believe is indicative of the 
debate regarding fragile states. Furthermore, it is probable that this shift has an 
impact on the condition of sovereignty in these countries.  
The shift in focus has primarily taken place in the last ten years and I will therefore 
focus on the peacebuilding efforts within this period. To be able to perform an in-
depth analysis of UN peacebuilding initiatives, I believe it is valuable to understand 
the evolution of peacebuilding within the UN context. I will therefore be including 
reports and perspectives pre-dating the ten year time period.  
The choice of the geographical focus on Africa in this thesis is a natural consequence 
of the choice of the current time period and the UN as the international peacebuilding 
actor. No other continent has experienced such a recent or large-scale project of 
intervention as Africa (Harrison, 2009). No continent has more countries listed on 
indexes over failed, collapsed or fragile states (Foreign Policy, 2011 and CPI, 2010), 
and no continent have more countries subject to peacebuilding interventions than 
Africa (UNPBC, N.D). Currently the UN has 6 countries on its Peacebuilding Agenda 
and these are all located in Africa: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Though every fragile state is a stand-alone 
case, Africa furthermore demonstrates a distinct historic context of decolonisation, 
which is interesting when examining sovereignty in the fragile state. This furthermore 
provides the thesis with interesting parameters for analysis. 
I have chosen to focus on Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone as 
I believe they are sufficiently different when it comes to geography, fragility, causes 
of conflict, conflict cycle and international response. It is my belief that the use of 
these countries as examples in the analysis will provide data that demonstrate 
general tendencies when it comes to sovereignty and peacebuilding.    
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Theory  
The following section focuses on the discussion of various aspects of the thesisʼ 
theory and relates directly to the theoretical application throughout the thesis. The 
thesis is constructed so that theoretical introduction, analysis and discussion are 
done in conjunction with each other. There will as such be no stand-alone section of 
theory.  
I have chosen to organise the thesis in two parts. The first part of the thesis is 
structured so that theory, analysis and discussion focus on the condition of fragility 
and sovereignty in African states. The second part of the thesis focuses on 
answering the research question regarding the influence of UN peacebuilding on 
fragile statesʼ sovereignty and expands on the theory by including additional 
perspectives on the subject.  
The purpose of the following is thus not to introduce the theoretical framework, as 
this will be done later in the thesis, but rather to present some of the methodological 
reflections needed for a nuanced discussion.  
 
 
Choice of theory 
I have chosen to generate a theoretical framework to elucidate the condition of the 
fragile state using theories regarding statehood and state failure. This results in a 
conceptualisation of the fragile state, which will be foundational for the rest of he 
thesis. In order to be able to answer the sub-question, I will thus be relying on the 
theoretical framework while applying theory regarding sovereignty.  
The state and sovereignty are two such interrelated subjects that they are hard to 
separate into two elements on their own. However, to be able to produce a working 
understanding of what constitutes a fragile state, I will initially focus on generating a 
working understanding of statehood. Theory regarding the state has thus been 
compiled using the works of various contributors such as Robert Jackson, Ashraf 
Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Robert Rotberg and George Sørensen. Through the use 
of these authors, several different theories and understandings of statehood are 
introduced and there next supplemented with relevant historical and practical 
findings. Though the authors vary on which points they emphasise, they all 
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distinguish themselves by viewing the state as a compilation of all of its moving parts 
and not as a naturally given condition. This introduces the notion of effective 
statehood rather than juridical (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008).  
This perception of statehood is instrumental to my understanding of state fragility, as 
it accordingly can be seen as a condition derived from the missing parts of statehood 
or maybe more precisely, as ineffectual statehood.  
This furthermore has implications when it comes to the statebuilding initiatives 
inherent in peacebuilding. The state is seen as something that can/must be 
constructed and not a pre-existing and absolute notion (Andersen, 2010).  
 
The different theoretical approaches to fragility are used to create a working 
understanding of the fragile state, which can be used when analysing the sovereignty 
of fragile states. One could argue that combining theoretical viewpoints in order to 
compile a working understanding of statehood and fragility can foster critique 
regarding theoretical confusion.  
However, state fragility is a complicated arena to navigate in, as it is rife with 
definitions and terminology, but little conclusive theory. It is my argument that using 
only one author for conceptualising the fragile state would limit the analysis of 
sovereignty within fragile states. The use of differing theoretical approaches allows 
for continued reflection of the concept. Further, the theoretical framework provides an 
applicable understanding of the fragile state to the analysis of sovereignty, which 
again provides the backbone for the analysis regarding fragile stateʼs sovereignty in 
an international environment. The sub-question is thus sought answered in the first 
section of the paper by applying traditional theoretical notions of sovereignty to the 
thesisʼ understanding of fragility.  
 
Some of the theory used, especially Robert Jacksonʼs Quasi-states: Sovereignty, 
International relations and the Third World from 1990, might seem outdated to some 
due to its age. However, his theory and understanding of state fragility is continuingly 
being put to use by authors such as Ghani and Lockhartʼs Fixing Failed States – A 
Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (2008) and Stephen Krasner in Power, 
the State, and Sovereignty – Essays on international relations (2009) and others. It is 
therefore my understanding that the basis of the theory is still considered to be 
relevant. Furthermore, Jacksonʼs theory focuses on the historical context of African 
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states and thus supplies the thesis with valuable insight on the geographical focus 
area.  
I have further tried to accommodate for this critique by including the authors above 
and other articles, which expand on state fragility and sovereignty.  
At the end of the first section of analysis I have furthermore included Graham 
Harrisonʼs perspective on fragile statesʼ sovereignty when seen in relation to 
international engagement. This section of analysis should be seen as a bridging the 
to sections of analysis and setting the stage for discussing sovereignty in relation to 
peacebuilding. 
 
The second part of the thesis first sees a brief elucidation of UN peacebuilding and 
statebuilding practices and then continues on to an analysis of fragile statesʼ 
sovereignty in the context of international intervention. The first analysis serves as 
foundation for understanding sovereignty in fragile states and arguments and 
conclusions drawn up in the first section of analysis are echoed and used throughout 
the second analysis.  
The conclusions from the first analysis are expanded in the second part of the thesis 
by including the theory of Stephen Krasner, who supply further perspectives on 
sovereignty related to international engagement and provides insight into other forms 
of sovereignty.  
Furthermore, theory regarding statebuilding is introduced in order to better 
understand the field, in which the UN peacebuilding takes place.  
In regard to the use of Graham Harrison, who does not in fact deal with neither the 
fragile state in the sense it is understood in this thesis or peacebuilding interventions, 
but rather with governance states and aid conditionality, I believe that his theory of 
sovereign frontiers can be used to illustrate the interaction between the weaker state 
and the international community. As such, I have accommodated for the use of his 
theory by looking at it from the perspective of the fragile state and thus substituting 
the governance state with the fragile state and aid conditionality with peacebuilding 
initiative. It is my belief that Harrison provides valuable insight into the field of 
sovereignty in the interaction with external actors. 
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Data 
The data used and applied in this paper must be discussed from a methodological 
standpoint – Why was it chosen, how is it used and what information is it able to 
convey? The following will be a reflection on these questions and will thus not be a 
presentation of the data itself.  
 
 
Choice of Data  
As a natural consequence of having two questions to answer the thesis is divided 
into two sections of analysis, where two sets of data are applied. The section dealing 
with the sub-question is primarily a theoretical analysis on the nature of the fragile 
state and how this is compatible with traditional notions of sovereignty. Data used for 
this section mostly consists of articles and chapters in books elaborating on the 
nature of the state and the evolution within the theory regarding sovereignty. The 
three countries used, as examples throughout the thesis will, however, be introduced 
here and attempted seen in relation to the conceptualisation of the fragile state. The 
empirical material consists of country descriptions and UN documents.  
The second section of analysis focuses on the interplay between peacebuilding and 
the fragile state and the influence on sovereignty in fragile states. This part of the 
thesis will be addressing the main research question. The data used for this analysis 
consists of theoretical articles and writings on the nature of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, shifting perceptions of sovereignty and empirical material on UN 
peacebuilding in the three fragile states introduced previously. The empirical material 
primarily consists of policy documents, background papers and reports from the last 
ten years, either from the UN or regarding UN peacebuilding missions. However to 
be able to perform an in-depth analysis a few reports documenting the origin and 
evolution of peacebuilding will be used. Throughout both sections of analysis I will be 
using examples from the three countries introduced in the first part of the thesis.  
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Selection criteria 
In a field littered with definitions and no agreement as to the number or nature of the 
fragile state, choosing data for analysis can be difficult.  
The conceptualisation of the fragile state has therefore been paramount in the 
selection of data. The data used to exemplify peacebuilding in fragile states has been 
selected by first narrowing the number of states to those currently at the centre of UN 
peacebuilding missions: Central African Republic, Burundi, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Secondly, my choice of case studies have come as a 
natural consequence of 1) the data available from the UN in the form of policy papers 
etc and 2) whether or not the countries have been listed consistently in the lowest 
echelon of World Banks Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. 
The CPIA functions as an assessment tool for determining whether countries belong 
in the LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress)  group – a definition, which has 
been inspirational for my conceptualisation of the fragile state. The CPIA is built on 
16 criteria all related to the appropriateness of the countriesʼ economic policies and 
the performance of the countriesʼ public institutions (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
McGillivray, 2011). The index is used to assess the quality of country policies and 
functions. Countries scoring less than 3.2 on the CPIA qualify as fragile states. 
Countries are considered “core” fragile states if their CPIA is below 3.0 (World Bank, 
2011).  
The states chosen for exemplification in the analysis sections have all, except Sierra 
Leone, who in 2010 managed to climb marginally above the 3.2 mark (3.208) (CPR, 
2010), consistently been part of the core group of fragile states since 2004 (CPIA, 
2004). It should be mentioned that several of the other countries currently part of 
peacebuilding operations such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau are also to be found in 
this group. However, the lack of usable data available from the UN excluded these 
two. Liberia has since 2010 also been listed in the core group, but the CPIA was 
unfortunately earlier unable to gain sufficient data for rating.  
I have chosen not to focus on a single country, as the purpose of this paper is to 
draw general assumptions as to the sovereignty of fragile states in Africa. Though a 
single case study might be able to provide valuable insight on the inner workings of 
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peacebuilding operations in a given country it was determined that it would be 
counterproductive to the general nature of the paper to focus solely on one country. 
The use of three countries to exemplify specific points and arguments allows for 
variations in outcome and provides the basic for a more nuanced analysis.  
With regards to policy documents concerning peacebuilding, it should be noted that 
all the majority of the documents originate from the UN or different sub-divisions. This 
is a result of the UN being the main provider of peacebuilding analysed in this paper 
and the main cooperating partner for the three countries when it comes to 
statebuilding (UNPBC, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a).  
The choice of articles, policy documents and material in general is linked to the 
premise of their relevance in relation to state fragility, peacebuilding/statebuilding and 
sovereignty. The articles are chosen in an attempt to clarify the field of research and 
to illuminate and include as many perspectives as possible. 
 
 
Methodology 
The methodology of the paper is primarily influenced by my choice to include a 
variety of authors in the theoretical framework and analysis. Further the bipartite 
nature of the analysis is illustrated by different approaches to the material.  
The first section of the thesis includes a theoretical elucidation and constitutes the 
backbone of the analysis while attempting to answer the sub-question. A historic and 
relatively descriptive approach will ensure that the reader is able to fully understand 
both the nature of the fragile state and the development within the perception of 
sovereignty. As the three country examples have been included in this part of the 
thesis primarily as examples of fragile states, it becomes a primarily theoretical 
approach, which seeks to place the concepts within a historical context. This 
approach to clarifying the evolution of the concepts is useful in analysing state 
fragility and sovereignty and provides an insight into the relationship between the two 
in the current context. This approach, which is grounded in post-modern critical 
theory, politicises the concepts to the degree that they can be utilised for analysis 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Further a comparative approach will be used to demonstrate 
the differences between the modern state and the fragile state. 
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The central part of the second section of the paper is an exploration of the UNʼs 
peacebuilding approach and its impact on sovereignty and thus deals with the main 
research question. The analysis will be drawing on examples from the three countries 
outline previously. The reason for using examples in order to present the UNʼs 
peacebuilding approach has been outlined above. It should, however, be noted that 
the use of country examples will influence the analysis, and subsequent conclusion 
of the thesis. An analysis and discussion of the research question will as such take 
place in this section based on the theory, date and conclusions introduced 
throughout the thesis.  
It is my belief that the country examples can be used efficiently to draw general 
conclusions on the nature of the fragile state as well as illustrate the affect of UN 
peacebuilding on sovereignty.  
 
 
Methodological reflections 
At the centre of the argument for using a variety of authors to build a theoretical 
framework including theories of both the fragile state and sovereignty, is an 
understanding of the field as being interconnected and complex. It is my belief that 
the use of different theoretical approaches will enhance the paperʼs understanding of 
the field and give the analysis a more nuanced character than if only one theoretical 
approach had been discussed.  
The theories used to describe the fragile state differ on what to emphasise when 
defining the concept. They even disagree on a common term to characterise the 
fragile state. The use of different theories is done to accommodate for the differing 
perspectives and provide complementary perspectives on the fragile state. This 
method acknowledges that each perspective provides something to the 
understanding of the fragile state and subsequently to the analysis of sovereignty in 
that context. In practical terms, what the inclusion of many different terms under one 
umbrella term means, is that when I use Robert Jacksonʼs perception of the quasi-
state, or Robert Rotbergʼs understanding of the failing state, I am using it to 
compliment or specify a specific point in my understanding of the fragile state.   
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Having explained this, it is necessary to outline considerations regarding the two 
sections of analysis in the paper. The conclusions made from the first section will be 
used as background understanding for the analysis of the UNʼs peacebuilding 
operationsʼ influence on fragile statesʼ sovereignty. It is my argument that the initial 
analysis on how the character of the fragile state and sovereignty are connected is 
paramount to forming any general conclusions regarding whether or not international 
engagement (in the form of UN peacebuilding) influence this relationship. Therefore, 
conclusions drawn from the first section of analysis will be included and have great 
say in answering the main research question:   
How does United Nations peacebuilding missions influence the sovereignty of 
fragile states in Africa?  
 
 
Outline 
The structure of the thesis is based on the bifurcated research question and has 
resulted in two sections of analysis. The structure provides the paper with a natural 
evolution where additional theory and perspectives are added when they are 
necessary for the understanding or the conclusions being drawn.  
Before starting the process of analysis the thesis states by introducing the security-
development nexus, which I believe is a foundational assumption for both the 
understanding of the fragile state and UN peacebuilding.   
The immediately following section of analysis starts with a conceptualisation and 
description of the field and terminology of the fragile state. The section goes on to 
include an elucidation of theory regarding the state, and finishes by presenting my 
understanding of the fragile state. Following this there will be a short introduction of 
the three countries as they are attempted placed within the fragile state framework. 
The section concludes with an analysis and discussion of sovereignty within the 
fragile state context.  
In-between the two sections of analysis is a section concluding on the condition of 
sovereignty in fragile states and relating this to the interaction with external actors. 
This serves to bridge the two sections and sets the stage for further analysis.  
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The second section of the thesis starts of with an introduction to the concept of 
peacebuilding and a placement of this within a UN context. Statebuilding is 
subsequently introduced as an additional feature of peacebuilding. The section 
concludes with an analysis of UN peacebuildingʼs influence on the condition of 
sovereignty in fragile states. The analysis will be including perspectives, arguments 
and conclusions made throughout the thesis.	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Introduction of analysis 
The structure of the following is based on the fact that the research question is split 
into two parts. The analysis is therefore divided into two subsections, each focused 
on answering one part of the research question. The sub-question will be the 
guideline for the first part of the thesis, whereas the main research question will be 
the focus of the second section. The two sections are organised relatively similarly 
with an introduction of the main component for analysis followed by an analysis of the 
condition of sovereignty.  
The first part of the thesis focuses on determining the condition of sovereignty within 
fragile states and starts by positioning the analysis within a theoretical framework of 
statehood. There next follows an introduction of the fragile state looking at the 
historical context and functionality of the state. The three countries examples are 
then introduced and sought placed within the established framework of fragility. The 
case countries will be used in moderation to exemplify specific points in the first part 
of the analysis. 
The second part of the thesis similarly starts by introducing the concept of 
peacebuilding and placing it within the UN context. Peacebuiling interventions will 
thereafter be placed within a larger framework of statebuilding theory, which is linked 
back to the fragile state. The subsequent analysis focuses on the influence of UN 
peacebuilding on the condition of sovereignty in fragile states. This is done by 
drawing on the conclusions made in the first section of analysis while elaborating on 
additional perspectives on sovereignty. 
 
Before initiating the first section of analysis, I find that it is relevant to introduce the 
underlying understanding, which I believe informs both the conceptualisation of the 
fragile state as well as the peacebuilding approach of the UN. 	  
The Security-Development Nexus  
The following acts as an introduction to the area of investigation and demonstrates 
an underlying assumption evident in the research field. The subsequent section 
introduces the security-development nexus and places this within the context of 
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international intervention and the fragile state. The security-development nexus 
should be understood as an underlying framework for both the debate about the 
fragile state and for the peacebuilding interventions by the UN. Though this has no 
direct bearing on the analysis of sovereignty it serves as the starting point for the 
discussion of the character of the fragile state and influences the UNʼs peacebuilding 
approach. It is therefore my belief that this introduction is relevant for the analysis of 
the research field and will allow for a thorough grounding of an otherwise abstract 
interaction.  
The security-development discourse to a large degree acts as the framework for the 
current discussion about fragile states. Furthermore, the so-called security-
development nexus also functions as a powerful incentive of the international 
community to engage in interventions in fragile situations. It is therefore relevant to 
understand the main features of this school of thought and to understand some of the 
notions that can be seen as having developed from this mindset. The main focus of 
this section is to clarify the connection between security and development, which the 
UN draws upon when it comes to peacebuilding. 
With the end of the Cold War came the end of the bi-polar world order and the 
subsequent focus on security and development as functions of this large-scale 
international conflict. Security now became a notion, which included a whole range of 
new threats, many in the global south. Also, developmental objectives shifted to 
include “Western” liberal values such as democracy, good governance, and free 
market economy (Andersen, 2008). This widening of both fields has led to an 
interdisciplinary overlap, which is often referred to as the security-development 
nexus.  
The security-development discourse assumes that security is essential for reducing 
poverty and that lack of development can lead to conflict (Kerr, 2007). As such 
security and development are seen as mutually dependent notions, which cannot be 
pursued isolated from each other (Andersen, 2008). Inherent within the security-
development discourse is also the notion that security is indivisible. This means that 
poverty and insecurity in one part of the world will adversely impact the national 
security of well-functioning states in other parts of the world. In order to preserve 
security at home, Western governments must thus pursue development abroad 
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(Duffield, 2001). In many ways this can be said to be the crux of international 
interventions in fragile states.  
The security-development nexus also draws on the liberal peace thesis, which 
argues that democracy is the best way to create conditions of peace and 
development both domestically and globally. The argument is that international order 
and human security can be achieved simultaneously by improving existing states 
through democratic reform, supporting values such as human rights, law and order, 
participation, inclusion, accountability and transparency (Andersen, 2008). The 
security-development nexus further lends itself to such notions as human security 
and the responsibility to protect. 
Human security takes its starting point in the welfare, safety and freedom of people 
and equates security with development rather than arms (UNDP, 1994). To a great 
extent the principles of human security corresponds with those evident in the overall 
security-development discourse and can be said to inform the actions of the UN in 
international interventions. The connection between conflict and human security is 
also at the centre of many UN reports and continues to hold sway as an argument for 
international intervention in intrastate conflicts (Kerr, 2007). Both human security and 
the responsibility to protect are continuously invoked to justify international 
intervention in fragile states. In spite of these principles being mentioned in an 
increasing number of reports the idea of intervention on the grounds of human 
security or the responsibility to protect remain contested concepts (Kerr, 2007).  
 
The responsibility to protect can be seen as growing out of the notion of protection for 
human security. The responsibility to protect was first discussed following the 
atrocities in Rwanda 1995. It was however not politicised until the International 
Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty in 2001 argued that if the state fails to 
protect its inhabitants, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect (Kerr, 2007). At the World Summit in 2005, UN member 
states agreed to include the responsibility to protect in the outcome report of the 
summit and agreed that the if states are unable to protect their citizens from mass 
atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing) 
the international community has a responsibility to react (WSO, 2005).  
 
	   23	  
The notion of responsibility to protect represents a tangible decrease in the value of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is within this context seen as a responsibility and not a right 
as has been the general understanding in international relations for centuries. In 
reality this means that fragile states experiencing internal conflict are at risk of having 
their sovereignty infringed.  
As one might guess the responsibility to protect is not widely accepted by developing 
countries as determining operational policy. For many developing nations the idea of 
making sovereignty conditional is seen as the West trying to control world politics and 
justifying outside interference in internal politics (Kerr, 2007).  
As demonstrated in the above, the security-development discourse has since the end 
of the Cold War had a large impact on the international communities, and especially 
the UNʼs way of addressing fragile states. This has meant that state fragility is seen 
as a source for transnational and international threats, that bad governance, weak 
institutions and poverty are seen as root causes of fragility and conflict, and that the 
international community feels entitled to take action to prevent fragility through 
statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions.  
The theory regarding the correlation between security and development goes beyond 
traditional state-centric understandings of both security and development. This 
represents an interesting dichotomy within the peacebuilding approach itself. 
Though, human-centric views on security and development have gained prominence 
in rhetorical practise, the state remains the fundamental unit in the international 
system and also the centre for development efforts. The state must be functioning in 
order to achieve development and security goals (Andersen, 2010). This can be seen 
as constituting the foundation for the idea that international order and human security 
can be pursued simultaneously through the “improvement” of existing states through 
liberal ideologies (Andersen, 2011). This understanding, alongside the understanding 
that democracy is the better state system, has shaped the interventions of the 
international community, especially the UNʼs, in fragile states all over the world.  
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The fragile state and sovereignty 
To be able to develop an understanding of the impact of peacebuilding on the 
sovereignty of fragile state it is first necessary to establish a working understanding 
of the so-called fragile state. In the following, I use various understandings of state 
fragility and traditional notions of sovereignty in order to be able to elaborate on the 
interconnected nature of the two. Understanding the fragile state is of great 
importance to this thesis, as the nature of national/domestic conditions are essential 
when examining international engagement and its ability to either reinforcing or 
undermining state sovereignty.  
 
Conceptualising the fragile state  
In the theoretical framework below, I will be using the different authors to elaborate 
on the notion of state fragility. This method does however, not accommodate for their 
different conceptualisations of the fragile state. A discussion of the different terms 
and understandings is therefore necessary to accommodate for the utility in the 
theoretical framework and the analysis. I have chosen to place the introduction of the 
fragile state term as the initial section of this part of the thesis due to the fact that all 
of the authors used later in the theory make use of different terminologies when 
elucidating their theoretical approach to the fragile state. The following section should 
be seen as a way to clarify nomenclature and to elaborate on the understanding of 
state fragility. This review allows for me to elaborate on my understanding of state 
fragility, which will be used throughout the thesis. The focus will therefore not be on 
listing the relevant functions of the state, but rather on demonstrating the evolution 
within the state fragility debate and introducing my approach to the concept. 
Though the notion of the fragile state is still a relatively new concept it has, as 
exemplified in the introduction, gained frequent use within international relations and 
most especially in relation to the security-development discourse. The fragile states 
agenda is however, surrounded by a great deal of critical debate. The term itself is 
highly contested. It is argued that the term in itself contains implicit normative 
assumptions of how states should perform and an understanding that all states, 
given the chance, will converge around a Western model of statehood (Mcloughlin, 
2012). Though the fragile state agenda has become very prominent in both rhetoric 
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and policy-making the field seems to be lacking theoretical or normative coherence 
or even a joint nomenclature. As a consequence the field has become muddled by 
terms and meanings, which cover a whole host of variations within the fragile state 
spectrum. Variations include, but are not limited to: weak states, quasi-states, 
collapsed states, illiberal democracies, rogue states, low income countries under 
stress (LICUS), and failing and failed states. 
As such there is no internationally recognised definition of state fragility. 
Consequently the nature of the fragile state is hard to qualify. What does, however, 
characterise all the terms above is that they all represent the relative strength or 
weakness of the state on a continuum from the strong well-functioning states on one 
end, failing or weak states somewhere towards the low end and rogue, failed or 
collapsed states at the other end. The meaning of state fragility terms is often 
contested and they are rarely applied in any coherent manner. Furthermore, the 
strong/weak state terminology has been criticised for implying that all states move 
along a set trajectory and for categorising state fragility as an absolute notion. 
Furthermore, this terminology can be criticised for setting the fragile state up against 
an ideal type of the state, which in reality is rarely seen (Stepputat and Engberg-
Pedersen, 2008).  
The terms describing state fragility have over time gone through an evolution in 
focus. Barry Buzan with his term weak states (1983) and William Zartman with his 
term collapsed states (1995) focused on government authority and the legitimate use 
of violence, ability to provide security and control of territory (Mcloughlin, 2012). 
These two definitions of fragility demonstrate a focus on some of the basic 
requirements for statehood.2 Robert Jackson with his term quasi states (1990) 
concentrated more directly on the connection between statehood and sovereignty 
and introduced a focus on the historical context in African states (Jackson, 1990). 
Fareed Zakaria with his illiberal democracies (1998) on the other hand to a great 
degree focused on regime type and lack of democracy when defining fragility 
(Carment et al, 2010). The term rogue states should be seen in relation to the focus 
on democracy as the determining factor in rating countries on the weak/strong scale. 
The concept came into rhetorical use under the Clinton Administration in the United 
States, but grew in international recognition following the terrorist attack on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  These	  will	  be	  further	  elaborated	  on	  in	  the	  theoretical	  framework	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September 11th 2001. One of the defining elements of the rogue state terminology is 
that the regime is authoritarian and that it violates human rights. These countries are 
seen as threats to international security and are believed to be sponsoring terrorism 
and to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (Chomsky, 2000). The rogue state 
term demonstrates a focus on liberal values when determining state fragility, as well 
as a clear understanding of who is to be protected from the fragile state, namely the 
national publics of the international community. These two terms furthermore 
demonstrate the context in which they are uttered. The term illiberal democracy can 
be seen as a reflection of the increased focus on liberal values following the end of 
the ʻCold Warʼ and the focus on democratisation as a conflict resolution tool. The 
rogue state term should equally be seen within this context, and was re-launched in 
US foreign policy vocabulary as a result of the events on September 11th 2001, and 
served to underscore the ʻWar Against Terrorʼ (GSDRC, 2012). 
Though the focus is on economic fragility/resilience and not on international security, 
the World Bank with its Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) term (2004) 
also adhere to the liberal mindset and points to weak governance and limited 
institutional capacity as the main indicators for state fragility. Moreover, the World 
Bank define LICUS countries as being those furthest away from achieving MDG 
goals and as having the UN present in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding capacity 
(World Bank, 2011). This definition of fragility demonstrates a focus, which has 
shifted slightly to include institutional capacity in the understanding of the fragile 
states. Due to the close working relationship between the World Bank and the UN 
this is also indicative of a shifting focus in UN peace operations from democratisation 
to capacity building (Andersen, 2008 and UNSG, 2009). Furthermore, the focus on 
UN peace operations as a requirement for state fragility strikes a note in relation to 
this paper as the countries used as examples fall under this category. It is however 
the understanding of this paper that the presence of peacekeepers/peacebuilders is 
a consequence of state fragility and not a defining element of it. Lastly Robert 
Rotberg's term failing states (2004) indicate a slight step away from the liberal 
mindset and a focus on fragility as defined by the statesʼ inability to achieve 
economic growth and deliver basic services to its populations (Rotberg, 2004 and 
Mcloughlin, 2012).  
This short introduction of a few of the main terms in the state fragility shows that the 
focus over time has shifted from a focus on functionality to one of performance. The 
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result is that there today seems to be a growing consensus that state fragility is a 
result of the state authoritiesʼ inability and/or unwillingness to deliver core functions 
and services to the majority of the people, this being; security, protection of public 
property, basic public services and infrastructure (OECD definition cited in Stepputat 
and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008).  
 
Functionality 
 
Performance 
 
The abovementioned is a description some of the authors understanding of state 
fragility and of the shift that has taken place within the field from functionality to 
performance. The following is an introduction of my understanding of state fragility. 
This will be the working understanding used throughout the thesis. 
 
Weak states, Barry Buzan, 1988 The inability to execute basic state 
functions 
Quasi states, Robert Jackson, 
1990 
The connection between historical 
context and the inability to provide 
basic state functions = limited 
sovereignty 
Collapsed states, I. William 
Zartman, 1995 
Ability to provide basic state 
functions 
Illiberal democracies (pseudo 
democracy, partial democracy, 
low intensity democracy, empty 
democracy, hybrid regime, 
delegative democracy), Fareed 
Zakaria, 1998 
The performance of the state 
related to liberal values 
Rogue states, US government, 
1993 
The performance of the state 
related to liberal values 
Low Income Countries Under 
Stress (LICUS), World Bank, 
2004  
The ability of the state to perform 
basic services through institutional 
capacity 
Failing and failed states, Robert 
Rotberg, 2004) 
The ability of the state to perform 
basic services through institutional 
capacity and the ability to uphold 
the conditions for own survival 
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My understanding and use of the term state fragility should be found in the 
operationalisation of the term in the first section of the thesis. Functions such as 
control of territory and legitimate use of force are paramount to determining state 
fragility. Equally valuable to the definition of the fragile state is the ability of the state 
to perform basic services and thus provide the populace with their basic needs for 
security and development. I find that my understanding of fragility is closely 
connected to the LICUS term of the World Bank. The LICUS term has previously 
been criticised for not adjusting to the implications of violent conflict and for being a 
product of a liberal ideology (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008). To 
accommodate for this, I have taken the security-development discussion in to 
account. It is furthermore, my desire to try to ground the fragile state term in the 
individual stateʼs context and thus include some of the main constructs of statehood 
in the definition. The thesisʼ understanding of fragility thus becomes a combination of 
traditional statehood understandings, which can be traced back to Bodin, Weber and 
Hobbes, a focus on state functions and performance-oriented parameters while 
having an eye on the historical context.  
What this conceptualisation and use of the state fragility term provides is a tool for 
understanding sovereignty in the context of the fragile state and subsequently 
provide an opportunity for analysing the impact of peacebuilding operations. 
As a point of clarification, I will throughout the thesis primarily use the terms fragile 
states and state fragility. In the theoretical introduction of the fragile state and when 
analysing the relationship between the fragile state and sovereignty I will be referring 
to my understanding of fragility. I will as such be using the theoretical approach of the 
authors to clarify specific points of the thesisʼ definition. Only if necessary or in order 
to clarify a certain point will I use other terms. 
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State Fragility 
This section starts by an outline of the ideal typical modern state. This allows for the 
use of a comparative method to point out some of the basic conditions of statehood 
that might be missing in fragile situations. The understanding of the fragile outline 
below is divided into sub-sections reflecting my conceptualisation explained above. 
Following this there will be a brief introduction of the three countries examples as 
they are placed within the fragile state framework. An analysis of fragile statesʼ 
sovereignty using theory and concepts regarding the concept concludes the section. 
 
The Modern State 
To a large degree, the fragile state finds itself in its opposition to the “normal”, well-
functioning or modern state. It therefore becomes relevant to examine the 
parameters of statehood in order to effectively determine the nature of the fragile 
state. The following outline of the modern state also serves as a backdrop to 
understanding some of the statebuilding exercises evident in UNʼs peacebuilding 
operations. 
The modern notion of the sovereign nation state is heavily influenced by the theories 
developed by Hobbes, Bodin, Machiavelli and Weber. As a result the modern 
understanding of the state is coloured by the notion of the independent, somewhat 
rational, omnipotent entity, which functions as a consequence of its social contract 
with its people and which has the legitimate use of force over its territory (Ghani and 
Lockhart, 2010). However, the modern state and the specific format of sovereign 
statehood that we know today first came into universal actuality in the early 20th 
century. Until then authors were not able to talk of the strong and legitimate state with 
a well-developed sense of law and order and resources based in national economy 
(Sørensen, 2001).    
There are many theories about what constitutes a state. Most of these however, rest 
on a few common presumptions: All states have a defined territory, a settled 
population and have some form of effective government (Heywood, 2002). 
Successful states provide their populations with shelter and protection against 
external as well as internal threats and enable an orderly, safe and at least 
marginally prosperous way of life for its citizens. Statehood is therefore traditionally 
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understood to be a positive condition, which provides conditions for a good life 
(Jackson, 1990).  
Today the traditional understanding of states has been augmented by the fact that 
states are viewed as sovereign states as soon as they possess constitutional 
independence. States thus become internationally recognised as valid members of 
the international society of states (Sørensen, 2001). In international relations the 
modern sovereign state is traditionally assumed to be self-reliant, more or less 
developed and to be authentically autonomous. Inclusion into the society of states 
thus means equal trading rights and reciprocity – the main point of inclusion is non-
discrimination and the belief that all countries are to fend for themselves and thus 
have a vested interest in following the rules of the game, which are equal to all 
(Jackson, 1990). 
The modern state represents the end product of a long historical process of 
homogenisation and evokes an assumed relationship between the identity of the 
state (seen as government) and the nation (seen as the people). As such the state is 
seen as an expression of the nation and thus representative of and responsible for 
the nations security, law and order, freedom and public welfare (Sørensen, 2001). 
The nation state thus becomes separated from any single ruler or government.  
As such there is more to the construction of the state than a defined territory and 
international recognition. This again relates to the relationship between the 
population and the state/government. American philosopher, John Dewey, further 
points to the people as the determinant of what functions/services the state is to 
deliver and how these are executed (Dewey paraphrased in Ghani and Lockhart, 
2009:117). The state receives its mandate and legitimacy through its interaction with 
and accountability to the people (Ibid, 2009). The modern notion of the state thus 
builds on the understanding that the duties and obligations of the individual towards 
the state – and – the rights and privileges they receive in return are equally important 
functions of the state. “The governed and the government are bound together by a 
common view of public value and interest, embodied in a compact – whether explicit 
or implicit – of rights and obligations (Ibid, 2009:121-122). 
The modern state is, by virtue of its relationship with its people, a multifunctional 
state that takes on a host of functions which were previously not within the purview of 
the state. The challenges are many and resources must be allocated to a whole host 
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of issues. It can easily be argued that very few countries in reality live up to all of 
these requirements. A state such as Greece for instance, which is considered a 
modern state, has great economical challenges and has recently been unable to 
deliver economic development or provide many people with sustainable opportunities 
for livelihood. The modern state must ideally hold sovereign territory, engage in a 
legitimate social contract with the people, hold legitimate monopoly over the 
instruments of violence and foster national identity and shared values. Furthermore, it 
must deliver on a myriad of functions to foster sustainable economic growth and 
development both short and long term.  
The modern state as described above can thus be seen as an idealised version of 
reality. This ideal modern state does, however, serve as mirror image against which 
the fragile states can be understood. The nature of the fragile state thus to a large 
extent is found in its antithesis to the modern state. The following section will 
elaborate on the nature of the fragile state and attempt to establish a working 
understanding of what constitutes state fragility.  
 
The Fragile State 
My understanding of state fragility hinges, as mentioned in the paragraph on the 
conceptualisation of the fragile state, on a few main points: Traditional 
understandings of the state, the historical context, the fulfilment of basic functions for 
statehood and the ability of the state when it comes to providing basic services to its 
population. Further it should be added that my understanding of the fragile state to a 
large degree relies on the connection between development and security as an 
implicit fact of the fragile state condition.  
I recognise that the pattern of fragility is different in each case, and that not all so-
called fragile states are fragile in all the areas listed. The following section should be 
seen as an archetypical description of the fragile state and thus be used as an 
instrument for understanding fragility in the context of sovereignty. I will begin by 
giving a short overview of development and security in the context of the fragile 
states.  
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The fragile state and the security-development nexus 
Fragile states are often characterised by poverty, general economic destitution and 
lack of security. This is substantiated by the fact that in 2010, 28-35 percent of the 
worldʼs most absolute poor were living in so-called fragile states (Carment et al., 
2010). People living in fragile states are listed as having a 50 percent higher 
prevalence of malnutrition, 20 percent higher child mortality and 18 percent lower 
rate of primary education (Mcloughlin, 2012). This means that at world level, fragile 
states are the ones furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG's) – for reference see for instance the World Banks definition of LICUS 
countries (World Bank, 2007).  
Further, it should be noted that statistically fragile states are the primary locus of 
violence in the world; both conflict related and otherwise (Carment et al., 2010). This 
demonstrates a correlation between lack of development, social instability and the 
occurrence of conflict. Authors such as Frances Stewart have furthermore 
demonstrated the causal mechanism of horizontal inequality within a specific 
population. Inequality is in this context defined as inequality between culturally 
defined groups and is seen as an explanatory variable related to the political stability 
of affected states. “[…] intergroup inequality has multiple dimensions – including 
political, economic and social – and that these can have a profound effect on both 
individual well-being and political stability (Stewart quoted in Carment et al. 2010:9)”. 
Stewartʼs primary argument is that when governmental policy exacerbates 
inequalities it constitutes the primary explanation for the emergence of intrastate 
conflict (Stewart, 2002).  
In an environment of violent conflict within states the minimum requirements of 
statehood are out of reach. Violent intrastate conflict demonstrates the inability of the 
state to control its territory and hold legitimate monopoly of the instruments of 
violence. When this occurs the state loses the ability to deliver conditions for 
sustainable economic growth and development both on shorter and longer term. The 
inability of the state to provide development and security creates an environment 
where all groups try to look after their own interests. This situation is perpetuated by 
the states efforts to secure its own survival by the use of force and thereby forcing 
the population to seek other ways of securing their survival – a situation that 
undermines the very idea of the state (Jackson, R., 2007 and Sørensen, 1998).  
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The Fragile state Framework 
The abovementioned gives insight into the reality of the fragile state, but does not 
demonstrate the background elements, which perpetuates the fragility of the state. 
To adequately explain my understanding and use of the fragile state, I have chosen 
to elaborate on the interconnected factors: historic context and state functions and 
ability to perform services below. 
 
The historical context 
The majority of states, which are currently referred to as fragile states, gained their 
juridical independence in the context of decolonisation. In this thesis the focus is on 
countries in Africa. Few of these, at the point of independence, had very many 
characteristics compatible with those of the modern nation state listed above 
(Jackson, 1990).  
Following the end of the Second World War, new principles made their way into 
international politics. Colonialism was outlawed and the principle of self-
determination gained prominence. Over the next two decades almost the entire 
African continent received independence and nations were almost immediately 
internationally recognised as states. In many of these states the only immediate 
change was the replacement of European officials with less skilled and inexperienced 
native officials (Ibid, 1990). Territories remained geographically the same, though 
they had been carved out along arbitrary lines of colonial rule and trade rights 
regardless of ethnic, religious, tribal or cultural disparities or old rivalries. As a result 
the new governments inherited polyglot national populations, which often found 
primary identification with local, ethnic or tribal communities (Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1994).  
Though colonialism most definitely has had a large impact on the structure of African 
states, the structure of political culture must also be taken into consideration. Many of 
the new states for instance saw corrupt elites and leaders seizing power and 
fostering systems of neopatrimonialism3, which favoured one population group over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Neopatrimonialism	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  patrons	  using	  state	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  loyalty	  of	  clients	  in	  
the	  general	  population.	  The	  informal	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  can	  often	  reach	  from	  very	  high	  in	  state	  
structures	  to	  individuals	  in	  small	  villages	  (Bratton	  and	  Van	  de	  Walle,	  1994).	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the other, and worsened social disparity (Ibid, 1994). Often funds where channelled 
away from the national economies and into the pockets of government officials. As a 
consequence the state in many cases found itself unable or unwilling to support 
public welfare and deliver basic services to the population at large (Sørensen, 2001). 
In some cases leaders have found it advantageous to administer a territory in 
distress and disorder, as they have been able to extract large sums of money 
unnoticed (Krasner, 2004). In such situations the population loses its reason for 
supporting the state. The nation (the people) and the state (the government/ruler) 
become separated and the nation state weakened as a result. As a consequence the 
material aspect of nationhood to a large degree disappears from the equation as the 
people have no desire to perform their duties and obligations as neither rights nor 
privileges are provided by the state. Also the material main aspect of the national 
economy suffers as the population is poor and the states tax collection capacity is 
low (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008).  
 
As a consequence many of these countries suffer from limited social coherence as 
well as populations that look towards their local communities for their welfare and 
security needs. Loyalty towards the state is thus lacking in many cases. The social 
contract between the state and the nation is therefore to some degree sundered and 
the state loses legitimacy in the context within which it functions. In some cases the 
state has subsequently become the very “evil” that the local population has had to 
seek protection from. In other cases rebel groups have emerged as response to the 
missing consensus on the state (Ibid, 2008). Unfortunately, violent conflict has in 
many cases been the outcome.  
The historical context has without a doubt contributed negatively to the creation of 
social and political cohesion in many African states. Few states were able to produce 
a coherent consensus on the idea of the state upon independence. This has often led 
to different ethnic groups or elites taking over governmental control and producing 
patterns of preferential treatment for some societal groups. Consequently large 
groups in the population have turned towards their local communities and ethnic 
affiliations for protection, welfare and sense of belonging (Sørensen, 2001). This 
weakens national identity and state legitimacy. State fragility can thus, using Barry 
Buzan's theory regarding the weak state, be seen as a consequence of the 
weakness in the idea of the state. When the people do not identify with the state or 
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cannot come to a consensus about the state – it becomes a fragile state. Fragile 
states, therefore, ʻeither do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and 
social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a 
major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nationʼ (Buzan 
1983:63). The historical context has thus been instrumental to placing many currently 
fragile states on a trajectory towards internal conflict.  
 
State functionality and performance 
The historical context is useful for understanding current conditions in fragile states 
and provides a starting point for elaborating on the functions of the state. 
“Fragile states is the term used for countries facing particularly severe development 
challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. 
Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe 
conflict. Ongoing armed conflicts affect three out of four fragile states (World Bank, 
2009)” 
State fragility, according to this quote, boils down to three components: weak 
institutional capacity, bad governance/political instability and the existence of conflict 
either past or present. The following will focus on the connection between these three 
components in the context of state functionality and performance.  
State functionality is closely connected to the stateʼs ability to provide the population 
with the conditions for security and development. Given the understanding that 
development and security are mutually dependent concepts, the insecure 
environment in fragile states can be seen as a consequence of the stateʼs inability or 
unwillingness to perform the functions demanded and to provide its population with 
the possibility to live a marginally prosperous life. In many cases this comes down to 
insufficient institutional capacity, lack of legitimate control over the forces violence 
and thus the inability to control the territory (Rotberg, 2004). Especially the political 
and juridical institutions are of importance to the successful management of state 
functions and to the stateʼs ability to provide security and welfare. Weak institutions, 
dysfunctional administration, and unpredictable rules that are corruptly or unfairly 
applied can lead to mistrust and a crisis of state legitimacy. Institutional weakness 
can lead to inconsistency in the administration of laws across the territory. This 
increases the risk of areas of land falling under the administration of militias and 
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other opposing powers and a loss of legitimate control over the forces of violence 
(Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). The fragile state loses the ability to provide security for 
its citizens, ensure compliance with official laws, make effective policies, promote 
participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the 
national economy and retain legitimacy (Jackson R., 2007:150). This not only 
decreases general security, but also hampers development opportunities. The result 
is a decreased trust in growth possibilities and often a decrease in foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Without the belief of the investors that the country can provide a 
predictable and well-functioning environment it is likely that finances will be 
distributed elsewhere (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). In many cases this leads to the 
state becoming unable to perform essential tasks and deliver basic services to the 
public. In this situation the basic contract between the state and the people is broken. 
The state becomes unable to provide the people with its basic rights and privileges 
and the people in return feel no responsibility to perform its duties and obligations to 
the state (Sørensen, 1998). The people thus become unwilling to accept the states 
interference in their lives. The stateʼs authority grows to be seen as illegitimate and 
the state therefore becomes unable to control its territory (Jackson, R., 2007). As a 
result these states suffer from fragility in the shape of: institutional weakness, inability 
to enact state policy, inability to perform tax collection, provide law and order and 
political stability, inability to consolidate power, ongoing economic and structural 
weakness, external vulnerability to international actors, intense social division, lack of 
cohesion and national identity and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for the sitting 
government and the governing institutions as a whole (Ibid:150). 
In order to clarify the points made above and to make the differentiation between the 
modern state and the fragile state more comprehensible I have created a chart listing 
the differences. The following chart should be understood as representing on the one 
hand the ideal type modern state and on the other hand a state which is failing on all 
counts.  In reality not all functions will have the same level of importance or hold the 
same influence on the stateʼs security and development status. 
The chart is inspired by Ghani and Lockhartʼs (2009:124-163) list of functions that the 
ideal state must perform and will later be used as reference point when analysing the 
UNʼs peacebuilding practices in the countries examples. Though Ghani and 
Lockhartʼs list originally included ten functions, I have chosen to focus on the ones, 
which I feel are most compatible with my conceptualisation of the fragile state: 
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Ideal state Fragile state 
Rule of law 
Equality under the law.  
Judicial system with checks and balances. 
Accountable government 
Absence of rule of law 
Parallel and informal rules  
Criminalised economy  
Rulers set themselves above the law.  
Monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force 
The legitimate monopoly over the means of 
violence. 
Ability/willingness to provide the population 
with security. 
Lack of legitimate monopoly of use of 
force 
Challenger to state authority  
Local communities providing security and 
welfare needs 
Delegitimized state  
Institutional capacity 
Uniformity and adherence to rules  
Accountable institutions   
Strong market economy 
Lack of institutional capacity 
Corrupt/unpredictable application of rules    
Inability to administer remote territories  
Spatial inequality and areas of exclusion  
Exclusion from market  
Management of public finances 
Sound prioritisation of resources. 
A balanced state budget 
Transparency and accountability of the 
budget.  
 
Failing to manage public finances 
Public means being diverted to private 
goals 
Powerful private persons or businesses 
refusing to pay taxes.  
Foreign aid dependency. 
Investment in human capital 
Creation of a stabile democratic base.  
Resolution of social issues through the 
political process.  
Eradication of poverty and social immobility.  
Failing to invest in human capital  
Inequality, social immobility and inability to 
eradicate poverty.  
Low life expectancy 
Brain drain  
Creation of citizenship rights 
The creation of equal rights  
Failing to create citizenship rights 
Social division  
Relations between the governed and the 
government become strained 
Formation of the market 
Access to possibilities for a prosperous life. 
Economic mobility. 
 
Failing to form a market: 
Development and economic prosperity is 
blocked.  
Disparity between rich and poor increases.  
The legitimacy of the system itself is called 
into question. 
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It is my belief that the conditions for state fragility should be seen as existing in a 
circular pattern where the various elements continuously influence each other – a 
pattern, from which it is extraordinarily hard to escape. The fragile state is thus very 
much characterised by its inability to perform basic state functions and its inability to 
provide basic services. It is therefore my understanding that state fragility in 
conclusion comes down to a lack of consensus on the national idea, social 
incoherence, lack of institutional soundness and subsequent ability to perform the 
functions of statehood and provide basic services. This leads to a lack of state 
legitimacy, an absence of the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence and 
therefore an inability to provide security and development for the population. In some 
cases only the very basic conditions for statehood stand fulfilled; defined territory, 
defined population and some form of government (even these might in rare cases 
such as Somalia be disregarded). State fragility thus comes down to the inability to 
control the territory, perform the basic state functions and provide the population with 
opportunities for security and development, and finally a government that is 
unaccountable to its population and thus has no legitimacy.  
 
In light of the abovementioned, I will introduce the three case countries used in the 
thesis and place these within the framework regarding the fragile state introduced 
above.  
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Country examples 
The three case countries used for exemplification in this thesis are all part of the 
UNʼs peacebuilding agenda and have all experienced recent or current violent 
internal conflict. In the following section I will provide a short description of each 
country while placing them within the fragile state framework. This section will serve 
as the foundation for the inclusion of examples in the remaining part of the thesis and 
should be able to help illustrate general trends when it comes to sovereignty in fragile 
states. 
 
The Republic of Burundi 
Burundi is situated in the Great Lakes region of southeast Africa. A region, which is 
notoriously instable due to conflicts in several of the surrounding countries (Huggins 
et al, 2005). Burundi is one of the worldʼs poorest nations with around half of the 
population living under the poverty line (World Bank, N.Da). The country primarily 
relies on export of tea and coffee, which accounts for most of their foreign currency 
earnings (BBC, 2012a).  
Burundi gained its independence from Belgium and the United Nations 
Administration it had been under in 1961 (BBC, 2012b). The country has since been 
plagued with social tension between the dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu 
majority. The social disparity came to a head in 1994, when the Hutu, Cyprien 
Ntaryamira, was appointed president and later the same year killed in Rwanda. This 
marked the beginning of one of Africa's most intractable conflicts (BBC, 2012a). The 
conflict demonstrates a lack of consensus on the national idea. Furthermore the 
socio-political crisis has damaged national cohesion and has disrupted economic and 
social development in the country (UNPBC, 2007A). Poor governance alongside 
policies of political and social exclusion led to a state that was unable and unwilling to 
perform basic functions and provide services for large segment of the population. 
This has lead to a disconnection between the population and the state, which can be 
seen as being instrumental in generating insecurity. Rebel groups emerged as a 
consequence and the government lost control of territory and the forces of violence. 
The fragile state became a reality. 
In 2001, following mediation by South Africa, a ceasefire was reached and a power-
sharing government was set up. Four years later Burundians voted in their first 
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parliamentary elections since the start of the civil war (BBC, 2012a). Today Burundi 
faces the difficult tasks of rebuilding a shattered economy and of forging national 
unity. The government and the last active rebel group signed a ceasefire in May 
2008, but post-election tension in 2010 have renewed fears of civil war. Relative 
peace after a 12-year ethnic-based civil war has been attributed partly to international 
mediation and support (BBC, 2012a). 
The UN has been engaged in peace operations within Burundi since 2004 and are 
currently present in the shape of an Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNPBC, N.D). 
 
 
The Central African Republic 
The Central African Republic, as the name implies, sits in the centre of the African 
continent surrounded by several countries suffering from civil unrest and severe 
development challenges such as Chad, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and, a little further removed, Uganda (Hanson, 2005). The Central African Republic is 
one of the worldʼs poorest countries and the country has been suffering from political 
unrest since its independence from France in 1960 (World Bank, N.Db, BBC, 2011a). 
The Central African Republic has a history of political instability and recurring armed 
conflict. Four of the countryʼs five presidents since independence in 1960 have been 
removed from power through unconstitutional means (UNPBC, 2009A). This 
demonstrates a lack of consensus around the national idea and the political latitude.  
The country is characterised by a lack of state authority. The state holds very little 
authority anywhere outside the capital and rebel groups and armed groups control 
large parts of the country (UNDPA, N.D). As such the state does not have control 
over the instruments of violence. That, coupled with ethnic tensions in the north and 
frequent armed incursions by rebel elements from neighbouring countries, means 
that the Central African Republic continues to suffer from insecurity and instability. 
This has resulted in the internal displacement of over 200.000 people and another 
100.000 refugees in neighbouring countries (UNPBC, 2009A and UNDPA, N.D).  
Due to the stateʼs inability to push its authority outside the capital and the 
surrounding areas the government is unable to perform fundamental state functions, 
or supply the population with basic services (UNPBC, 2009A). The population has 
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been forced to either flee or depend on their local community for security, welfare and 
development needs. This leads to further separation of state and nation and 
delegitimises the government. The Central African Republic is at the centre of a 
socio-political crisis. 
In 2008 a peace accord was signed between the government and the leaders of 
three rebel groups. Rebel groups were disarmed and demobilised. In 2009 a National 
unity government, which included leaders of the two main rebel groups, was unveiled 
(BBC, 2011b). The Central African Republic has experienced a multi-dimensional 
crisis over the last several decades and as a result today the countries socio-political 
situation can be described as fragile (UNPBC, 2009A). CAR continues to be racked 
with rebel fighting both from internal rebel groups but also from Ugandaʼs Lordʼs 
Resistance Army (LRA) (BBC, 2011b). In spite of international support and the 
presence of UN and African Union (AU) troops the state struggles to provide 
conditions for security and development to its population. 
The UN has been engaged in peace operations within the Central African Republic 
since 1998 and are currently present in the shape of an Integrated Peacebuilding 
Office (BBC, 2011b, UNPBC, N.D). 
 
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone, which became independent from Great Britain in 1961, is situated on 
the Western coast of Africa. The country, alongside neighbouring countries Liberia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Ivory Coast, have contributed to making the region 
instable. The country experienced a steep decline in government revenues from 250 
million in the 1970ʼs to 10 million 1999. This demonstrates the countries economic 
ʻunderdevelopmentʼ, which can be said to have had a profound impact on the 
countries social development and the emergence of conflict (Krasner, 2004). The 
country emerged from major civil conflict in 2002 (BBC, 2012a). 
Sierra Leone was thrust into a civil war in 1991 when the former army corporal Foday 
Sankoh and his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began capturing towns on the 
border to Liberia. The following years saw several military coups and general political 
unrest (Ibid). In 1996 the newly elected president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah signed a 
peace accord with Sankoh and the RUF. However the peace accord only lasted 
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briefly before a military junta took over and suspended the constitution. After 
sanctions from the UK and the UN and a Nigerian lead West African intervention 
(ECOMOG), which lead to bloody fighting in Freetown, a peace accord was reached 
in 1999 (BBC, 2012b). The political instability in Sierra Leone demonstrates 
widespread inconsistency in the national idea and an inability of the state to 
legitimately control the instruments of violence as well as the territory. As such the 
state has been unable to provide either the conditions for the security or development 
for the populace. 
In 1999 UN troops arrived to police the peace accord reached at Lomé in Togo. The 
following year several hundred peacekeepers were abducted as they entered the 
countryʼs diamond area. Sierra Leoneʼs natural resources have played a large role in 
fuelling the conflict as well the one in neighbouring Liberia. It is estimated that the 
civil conflict cost approx. 50.000 lives in Sierra Leone (Krasner, 2004). In 2002 the 
civil war was declared over and the UN reported that more than 75.000 rebels had 
been disarmed (UNIPSIL, N.D). Kabbah became the first president after the end of 
the war when he won the presidential election in the same year (BBC, 2012b). 
Economic recovery from the crisis has been slow, partly because the reconstruction 
needs are so great. Today the government struggles with inadequacy in state 
capacity and inability to provide basic services to the population (UNPBC, 2007B). 
Although Sierra Leone has experienced economic growth in recent years, around half 
of the governmentʼs revenues come from external donors (BBC, 2012a). 
Unemployment and marginalisation of the youth have in recent years been the main 
cause of instability and insecurity (UNPBC, 2007B). 
The UN has had peace missions in Sierra Leone since 1999 and are currently 
present in the shape of an Integrated Peacebuilding Office (Krasner, 2004 and 
UNPBC, N.D) 
 
As illustrated by the country descriptions above, all three countries display the main 
features of state fragility. In spite of differences in conflict triggers and conflict 
evolution, all of the countries struggle to provide the conditions of security and 
development to their populations. The conflicts equally display the lack of consensus 
on the national idea and the political latitude. Though current situations differ in the 
three countries, all of them are characterised by varying degrees of institutional 
weakness and inability to provide basic services and perform state functions. In the 
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worst cases this means that the monopoly of the instruments is out of the statesʼ 
hands and that the state has lost control over the national territory. All three countries 
can without much disagreement be labelled as fragile states. It is my argument that 
the specifics of these three countries can supply this thesis with valuable information 
for demonstrating how the nature of the fragile state influences the condition of 
sovereignty. 
 
 
Sovereignty in the fragile state 
Inherent within the fragile states debate is the question of sovereignty. The following 
section will include a brief introduction of traditional theories regarding the concept of 
sovereignty. Subsequently follows an analysis of sovereignty in the context of the 
fragile state. This analysis should be seen as the starting point for the second 
analysis regarding the interplay between fragile statesʼ sovereignty and 
peacebuilding interventions. The analysis will provide an answer to the research sub-
question: How does the character of the fragile state influence the condition of 
sovereignty in these states?  
 
The modern notion of the sovereign nation state as an entity in international relation 
can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Sørensen, 1998). 
Sovereignty was then merely understood as a feature of the centre of power within a 
specific territory and was a result of internal processes (Jackson, 1990). Today, the 
notion of sovereignty is closely linked to the nature of the state and rests on the 
condition of complete independent authority over a given territory (Sørensen, 1998). 
Sovereignty is thus dependent on the existence of constitutional independence and is 
exercised both internally, towards the territory and population of the country or 
externally, in relation to other states (Jackson, 1990).  
 
Due to the close link between statehood and sovereignty it is relevant to question 
how the condition of sovereignty is affected in states that suffer from the long range 
of problems listed in the previous section. If one were to shrink the notion of 
sovereignty down to its absolutist core of ʻcomplete authority over a given territoryʼ, it 
seems that very few archetypical fragile states would be able to claim sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is here understood to be the exclusion of any other authority on the 
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jurisdiction of the state. Weberʼs focus on the legitimate monopoly violence, which is 
often lost in fragile states due to rebel groups, military coups etc., can be seen as the 
very definition of this (Andersen and Kaspersen, 2005). The fact that there is, or 
recently has been, violent opposition to the stateʼs authority in the form of civil conflict 
places fragile states outside this “narrow” understanding of sovereign statehood. 
However, according to Stephen Krasner, sovereignty should be understood as a 
concept consisting of four interrelated parts, all related to the internal/external 
dimension of statehood: Domestic sovereignty; Interdependence sovereignty; 
Westphalian sovereignty; and International legal sovereignty (Krasner, 2009). All of 
these terms, which will be described in greater detail below, represent a relevant 
perspective when analysing sovereignty in fragile states.  
 
Domestic Sovereignty 
The intellectual history of sovereignty is most closely connected to domestic 
sovereignty and has its roots in the search for the legitimacy of the source of 
authority within the state (Slomp, 2008). Domestic sovereignty (also referred to as 
internal sovereignty) deals with the formal organisation of political authority within a 
given territory, and speaks to the ability of the public authorities to uphold control 
within the rules set by their own policies (Krasner, 2009). The ideal typical state holds 
strong authority, which allows it to enter into agreements, create sustainable policies 
and enforce sanctions for the violation of laws. The ability of leadership to prevent 
violations is a key variable in determining internal sovereignty (Jackson, 1990). As 
such low institutional capacity to create and enforce policies and missing legitimacy 
as a consequence of social incoherence or disparity can be said to lead to 
questionable domestic sovereignty. Lacking domestic sovereignty is expressed 
through social and political instability (Slomp, 2008). From the descriptions above it is 
evident that all three country examples suffer from inability to enforce policies within 
their own territory. It is perhaps most evident in the Central African Republic where 
the government hold virtually no authority outside the capital.   
Domestic sovereignty assumes that the modern, well-functioning state exercise 
legitimate authority and therefore enjoy strong internal support due to the belief of the 
population that the state will provide the conditions for a good life (Krasner, 1999). In 
a country such as Burundi, which has faced severe social disparity due to ethnic 
tensions it must be argued that the state in reality have very little joint internal 
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support. Though the government has agree to a power sharing arrangement the 
ongoing political unrest demonstrates the instability of this arrangement and the lack 
of support of this both within the government and within the general population.  
Domestic sovereignty, more than any of the other types, should be seen in relation to 
the historical context of African fragile states. Historically, juridical independence and 
subsequent sovereignty came as a result of empirical reality. Ergo the state or the 
ruler demonstrated the ability to exercise authority over the territory before 
international legal recognition was provided and sovereignty became a reality. This 
stands in stark contrast to the immediate legal right of sovereignty given to former 
colonial states in Africa following independence. The three countries described above 
had no chance to demonstrate their actuality before they were recognised as states 
on the same level as other well-established states. Authors such as Robert Jackson 
argue that as a result, todayʼs fragile states hold sovereignty without actually having 
gone through the internal process of state-making and sometimes without holding 
power in the entire territory (Jackson, 1990).  
Taking Jacksonʼs point into consideration, it is my argument, that the problematic 
nature of domestic sovereignty in fragile states in Africa can be traced back to the 
very genesis of the post-colonial state and hinges on the poor domestic coherence 
that has been described previously. The historical inheritance of social incoherence 
and poor political stability in the form of neo-patrimonialism has set the scene for 
weak domestic sovereignty. That is not to say that domestic sovereignty cannot be 
enhanced by focused improvements of the functions and performance of the state. 
However, it is questionable whether domestic sovereignty can truly be absolute if the 
state does not have legitimacy and support of the population. It is therefore often the 
argument that the fragile state would be better equipped for handling social 
incoherence and hold stronger legitimacy if it had a stronger foundation in popular 
rule (or public sovereignty4) (Heywood, 2002). It can be argued that this is where the 
focus on democratisation originated for organisations such as the UN (UNSG, 1992 
and UNSG, 1998).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Public	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  no	  higher	  authority	  than	  the	  people	  (the	  basis	  of	  democracy)	  (Heywood,	  2002)	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Interdependence Sovereignty 
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate 
flows of information and ideas, arms, goods, people, diseases and capital and so on 
across the borders of their territory and is closely related to the concept of domestic 
sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). Domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty 
are interlinked. Though inability to control the flows of ʻgoods and badsʼ across 
borders does not have any direct influence on the authority structure of decision-
making, it does have some influence when measured solely on control (Ibid, 1999).  
Further it can be argued that inability to control borders might challenge state 
legitimacy in the shape of spill-over from neighbouring countriesʼ instability as is the 
case with all of the three countries described above. An example is the Central 
African Republic where the LRA has wreaked havoc in border areas and thousands 
of people have been forced to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere (BBC, 
2011a). A country such as Sierra Leone with its diamonds can equally be seen as an 
example of this spill-over effect. In the 1990ʼs the conflict in neighbouring Liberia was 
fuelled by blood diamonds and the warlord and later president Charles Taylor has 
been convicted of war crimes committed in Sierra Leone during this time (Brumfield, 
2012). As such the inability to control borders has the potential to influence the 
stability not only in the country in question, but also in neighbouring countries. This is 
a serious concern in regions where several countries are fragile. Something, which is 
relevant in the case of all three countries, used as examples in this thesis 
Furthermore, such lack of control shows the inability of the state to effectively rule its 
entire territory and can result in the population turning towards local communities for 
their safety and welfare needs. This results in a decrease in support of the state and 
thus a decrease in domestic sovereignty. It can therefore be argued that decreased 
control in one area pertained to a dimension of sovereignty can lead to a decrease in 
control over another.  
Krasner argues that fundamentally sovereignty is a matter of control and authority. 
Interdependence sovereignty deals solely with the ability to exercise that control 
when it comes to the movement of goods and people across national borders. 
Domestic sovereignty is the sole form of sovereignty, which deals with both the 
authority – i.e. what authority structures are recognised as legitimate within the state 
– and with control – i.e. how effective is the level of control exercised on behalf of 
these structures (Krasner, 2009).  
	   47	  
It is common for observers to suggest that sovereignty in general is eroding as a side 
effect of globalisation and due to the inability of states to regulate and control the flow 
of goods, people, pollution, finances, and diseases etcetera over national borders 
(Krasner, 2009). While this might be true as a generalised statement it is perhaps 
especially evident in fragile states.  
Interdependence sovereignty is, in my opinion, a variable of institutional capacity and 
the general functionality of statehood. Institutional capacity is instrumental for the 
control of territory and for the ability of the state to regulate and enforce laws and 
policies even in remote areas (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). Being as fragile states 
often suffer from limited institutional capacity, independence sovereignty also 
becomes limited. 
 
Both of these dimensions of sovereignty can be included within the term political or 
de facto sovereignty, which is concerned with whether control in fact exists within a 
given polity. Cooperation and respect of the populace; control of resources and 
means of enforcement and security; and ability to carry out various functions of state 
all represent measures of de facto sovereignty (Slomp, 2008). As these can be seen 
as corresponding with the conditions of fragility described previously, it is evident that 
the character of the fragile state affects the condition of sovereignty. In conclusion it 
can be argued that the two internal dimensions of sovereignty, which deal with the 
ability to rule legitimately within the territory, are both severely limited in fragile states. 
The lack of the internal dimensions of sovereignty is as such closely connected to the 
very nature of the fragile state. 
 
To be able to give a nuanced answer on the sub-question it is however, valuable to 
also take into account the two dimensions of sovereignty, which are concerned with 
external and legal parameters of the concept. 
 
Westphalian Sovereignty 
The notion of Westphalian sovereignty can be seen as straddling the fence when it 
comes to the internal/external dichotomy. The term refers to political organisation 
based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given 
territory. The sovereign state is here understood to exercise absolute and 
unrestricted power over all groups and institutions within a given territory (Krasner, 
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1999). As demonstrated in all three of the countries mentioned above, fragile states 
rarely hold the authority or the ability to exercise complete control over their territory 
or hold monopoly over the instruments of violence. The internal aspects of 
Westphalian sovereignty are as such often absent in fragile states. The concept 
however, is less concerned with the ability to exercise control and more directly 
focused on the right to do so (Slomp, 2008). This means that if a state is recognised 
as being constitutionally independent, the sitting government holds the right to rule 
independently over policy areas concerning that state.  
This right to rule is exactly what is questioned with the introduction of human security 
and the responsibility to protect into international relations. As such Westphalian 
sovereignty is associated with the principle of non-intervention and the understanding 
that all states must respect the independence of another state, and that no state 
must stand in judgement over actions committed by a sovereign state within its own 
territory (Krasner, 1999). The twentieth century has seen a focus on the external 
aspects of sovereignty and on the principle of non-intervention in particular. This 
means that Westphalian sovereignty in many ways has become the pivot point of the 
debate concerning sovereignty and the fragile state. Paradoxically, it is the domestic 
aspects of the fragile stateʼs sovereignty, which is responsible for the existence of a 
debate in the first place. 
As demonstrated briefly above, fragile states are often the centre of international 
intervention in order to prevent conflict or to boost development. These countries 
therefore become reliant on outside assistance in order to establish security and 
development. It can be argued that this constitutes a violation of the principle of non-
intervention and that Westphalian sovereignty in these countries has become a 
questionable condition.  
This argument can equally be illustrated by looking at less invasive interventions than 
peacebuilding. Throughout the 80ʼs and 90ʼs, fragile states have (separately from 
peacebuilding initiatives) been subject to international development aid, financial 
restructuring programmes and so on. All of these come accompanied with conditions 
for reform (Harrison, 2009). The implicit understanding of aid conditionality is that 
donors gain say in policy-making and thus limit the absolute power of the state 
(Zormelo, 1996). This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
analysis regarding the influence of international intervention on fragile statesʼ 
sovereignty. It is however appropriate to mention that Westphalian sovereignty and 
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the principle of non-intervention vs. the security-development nexus and human 
security is at the centre of heated debate in international fora and will be elaborated 
on in the following.  
 
International Legal Sovereignty 
The last and most distinctly external dimension of sovereignty, International legal 
sovereignty (or de jure sovereignty), usually refers to the mutual recognition of 
juridical independence between states that hold constitutional independence (Slomp, 
2008). International legal sovereignty is therefore concerned with the political status 
of entities in the international system. When the state is internationally recognised it 
is considered juridical equal to others. Subsequently it is able to enter into 
international organisations and take part in international agreements. In relation to 
this it should mentioned that if a state holds international legal and Westphalian 
sovereignty, it maintains the authority or the right to exercise control over its own 
territory (Krasner, 2009). 
Theoretically international legal sovereignty is given to a political entity with a defined 
territory and formal juridical independence regardless of its size or power (Krasner, 
1999). This form of sovereignty can thus be seen as a positivist category, which is 
almost universally understood as a construct of the contemporary world. Neo-realists 
consequently see sovereignty as a starting point of political analysis and a logical 
abstraction rather than a contingent feature of international politics (Harrison, 2009) 
As such rulers universally covet international legal sovereignty as it provides them 
with costless legitimacy and often places them in a position of power with their 
domestic audience (Jackson, 1990).  
 
It is my argument that the only dimension of sovereignty which fragile states are 
undoubtedly able to claim is international legal sovereignty. All three countries used 
as examples in this thesis are internationally recognised as juridical independent 
states. All three states are members of the UN and are theoretically seen as equals 
in the international system. International recognition provides the fragile states with 
the option to secure external resources, which enhances stability, promotes security 
and the economic and ideological interests of the constituents. International legal 
sovereignty also has the added benefit of increasing and enforcing the idea of the 
nation and thus increases national identity (Krasner, 1999).  
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As evidenced by the above, the various kinds of sovereignty do not necessarily co-
exist in all states. The exercise of one kind of sovereignty might lead to a decrease in 
or undermining of others, and the lack of control of one might lead to the decrease of 
another. Some fragile states might have international legal sovereignty while 
completely lacking other forms of sovereignty. An example of this is Somalia, which 
theoretically still holds international legal sovereignty, but no Westphalian, domestic 
or interdependent sovereignty. Though not all states hold all forms of sovereignty, 
states are often perceived as sovereign if they hold international legal sovereignty 
(Ibid, 1999).  
Most scholars however, argue that neither the internal/political nor the external/legal 
dimensions of sovereignty are viable on their own (Krasner, 2004). Legitimacy and 
legality are equally as important as the ability to enforce policy. Indeed it can be 
argued that sovereignty cannot be split up into different and easily analysed units, as 
they are interrelated parts of the same whole (Slomp, 2008). As such the value of 
deconstructing the concept of sovereignty into distinguishable parts is mainly 
heuristic and a way to highlight the multi-layered nature of the concept.  
The following chart illustrates the condition of sovereignty in fragile states and should 
be seen as a demonstrating this heuristic separation: 
 Present Partially present Absent 
Domestic 
sovereignty 
  X 
Interdendence 
sovereignty 
  X 
Westphalian 
sovereignty 
 X  
International legal 
sovereignty 
X   
 
As evidenced by the abovementioned sovereignty in fragile states can be seen as 
heavily dependent on the character of the fragile state and the universal legal rights 
to sovereignty. It is my argument that when it comes to international intervention the 
character of the fragile state and the lack of domestic and interdependece 
sovereignty has become the aspects of most relevance. This is not to say that the 
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two other aspects of sovereignty in fragile states do not hold significance, but merely 
that the condition of condition of fragility and the missing aspects of sovereignty has 
become what sets the fragile state apart. This thus becomes the areas, which the 
international community must intervene in, whereas the legal dimensions of 
sovereignty merely become the stumbling block. 
Robert Jackson, when discussing quasi-states, argues that it is primarily the 
international community, who maintains the fiction of African sovereignty, which 
African ruling elites draw on to build up their own fractionalised, partial and often 
contested domestic sovereignty (Jackson, 1990). 
 
The nature of the fragile state has lead to a new kind of territorial legitimacy removed 
from the inward substance of sovereignty. It can thus be argued that there is little 
merit in continuing to assume sovereignty in fragile states as an abstract positive 
notion in the traditional sense (Harrison, 2009).  
Acknowledging that sovereignty, when it comes to fragile states in Africa, is removed 
from its categorical status, it becomes difficult to establish a set of conditions, which 
actually exist or are imminent in African states and that allow us to speak of 
sovereignty as a standard by which to evaluate fragile states in an international 
relations context. Without sovereignty as a reference point it is complex to analyse 
the international relations of fragile states and frame critical understandings of 
intervention and peacebuilding. The legal dimensions of sovereignty here find their 
relevance, as they become the aspects used to determine interaction.  
The concept of sovereignty in relation to fragile states must therefore, by necessity, 
be used as a method to evaluate the diversity of political practices that are located in 
the engagement between elites in control of the state and the international 
community (Harrison, 2009).  
In order to understand this fully, it is useful to apply Jacksonʼs argument; that 
sovereignty must be understood in the context in which it exists (Jackson, 1990). 
Fragile states in Africa are legally sovereign, but they are not necessarily physically 
insular and most of them are economically dependent on foreign states or 
organisations. Despite of the actual condition of the state in question, todayʼs states 
are only very rarely allowed to disappear juridical out of international community. This 
is relevant when discussing the impact of the fragile stateʼs nature on sovereignty. It 
can be argued that sovereignty in fragile states to a large degree is influenced by the 
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domestic situation and that is almost has become a phenomenon separate from the 
domestic dimension of the concept. As such it is the very fragility of the state that 
destabilises sovereignty and removes it from its categorical status. 
 
Fragile state sovereignty and the external actor 
It can be argued that sovereignty in the context of fragile states has become its own 
phenomenon separate from traditional notions of sovereignty. Conditions necessary 
for domestic sovereignty are in principle lacking or at least diminished and as such 
only contribute negatively to the overall condition of sovereignty. Fragile statesʼ 
sovereignty thus to a large degree hinges on the external dimensions of the concept. 
International legal sovereignty is a given as this was acquired at independence and 
continues to hold legality in the international community of states.  
Westphalian sovereignty seems to be the dimension of sovereignty, which is most 
jealously guarded and which holds the most importance when determining the 
condition of sovereignty in fragile states in relation to external factors. The features 
inherent in Westphalian sovereignty concerning the right to control the territory and 
the exclusion of outsiders from domestic affairs seem to be the main weapons in 
fragile statesʼ arsenal when it comes to negotiating influence with international actors.  
In relation to the negotiation of influence with external actors it is interesting to note 
that sovereignty in fragile states in Africa to a large degree have become reliant on 
the very conditions of fragility. It is precisely the incoherence in national identity, lack 
of resources, weak institutions and lack of legitimate political authority structures that 
constitute the legitimacy of the states request for international assistance to 
consolidate its power. A circle of continued mutually amplifying notions thus becomes 
apparent. The state is fragile, and has contested sovereignty, as a consequence of 
its problems in national coherence, the lack of strong institutions and an inability to 
exercise legitimate force over its territory, but it is by the virtue of these difficulties 
that it is now deemed eligible for international assistance and it is also on these 
grounds that it stakes its sovereignty.  
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As such the character of the fragile state has become the very centre of the stateʼs 
claim to sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty as well as 
large aspects of Westphalian sovereigntyʼs internal aspects are lacking in fragile 
states due to the nature of the fragile state. As such the fragile state is both in need 
of and vulnerable to external influence. The de jure aspect of sovereignty has thus 
been elevated to be of primary importance. 
 
It can thus be argued that sovereignty in fragile states is used as a strategic claim 
made by political elites, not in order to achieve higher levels of self-determination, but 
rather in order to engage in a game of control with donors in regards to the pace and 
scope of reform and access to external finance (Jackson, 1990). Sovereignty has 
thus become a political resource that is constructed, evoked, challenged and 
defended and not as such a pre-existing fact. Sovereignty in fragile states can 
subsequently be seen as a political interaction and not a condition (Harrison, 2009). It 
can be argued that the complex and insecure nature of the fragile state has been 
instrumental in placing the state in a situation where sovereignty is determined in the 
interaction with its external partners and less by the de facto reality.  
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This conclusion introduces a need for elaboration on the nature of sovereignty in the 
interplay between the fragile state and the international community. The following is 
an introduction to the field of international intervention as well as an introduction to 
the concept of ʻsovereign frontiersʼ developed by Graham Harrison. The section is 
used to elaborate on the changing nature of sovereignty and the influence of the 
international community on the sovereignty of fragile states. The following works a 
bridge between the two sections of analysis and sets the stage for discussing 
peacebuilding intervention in the context of the sovereignty of fragile states. The 
section thus allows for an inclusion of additional perspectives on the character of the 
fragile state in the interaction with external actors. 
	  
Sovereignty and international intervention 
When discussing sovereignty in relation to international intervention it is relevant to 
take into account the origin of the current interventionist practice. As mentioned in the 
introduction, intervention in fragile states is far from a new practice. What is new 
however, is the way in which intervention is facilitated and the emphasis on security 
and development. The end of the bi-polar world order was instrumental in bringing 
about the focus on liberal ideology (Andersen, 2010). Notions such as good 
governance, human rights, human security and the responsibility to protect have 
made their way into rhetoric and policy-making in large multi-lateral organisations 
such as the UN (Kerr, 2007). Interventions in fragile states have become an avenue 
for pursuing these ends. Harrison argues that interventions subsequently should be 
seen as means to an end that is external to it, namely the pursuit of liberal ideology 
(Harrison, 2009). Interventions in fragile states in this optic become extensions of 
“Western” beliefs and the national sovereignty of the countries intervened in, merely 
the stumbling block.  
 
Though conventional sovereignty continues to have paramount importance for the 
structure of the international system (Krasner, 2004). The pursuit of liberal ideals 
such as human security, the responsibility to protect and even good governance 
have become prevalent in rhetoric and policy (Kerr, 2007 and WSO, 2005). 
Sovereignty is, as a consequence, no longer considered an absolute notion in the 
sense that the state has unlimited power to govern its people and territory. The 
relationship between these two paradigms is continuously shifting and over the last 
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two decades the world has seen a large number of international interventions 
balancing in-between the respect for conventional sovereignty and the pursuit of 
liberal ideologies (Boerefijin and Goldschmidt, 2008). In this thesis, international 
intervention is thus viewed both in relation to its motivational background and the 
political practice.  
 
As illustrated above, the nature of the fragile state has a deep impact on the 
condition of sovereignty. As a result, sovereignty has lost its categorical status in 
these countries. Fragile states, that are characterised by both developmental and 
security problems, face challenges on the domestic and interdependence aspects of 
sovereignty and are often as a result of this forced to seek external assistance and 
relinquish a degree of Westphalian sovereignty. In this environment, sovereignty 
becomes an object for negotiation (Harrison, 2009). The negotiation of sovereignty, 
in relation to international intervention in fragile states, should thus accordingly be 
viewed in relation to the ʻexternalʼ Westphalian dimension of sovereignty. 
Westphalian sovereignty to a large degree functions as the ʻspaceʼ for negotiation 
between fragile states and international agencies.  
 
International intervention might find their area of operation within the space of 
domestic and interdependence dimensions of sovereignty, but Westphalian 
sovereignty is dimension relevant for the negotiation of the interventionist activities. 
It is my argument that the Westphalian sovereignty ʻspaceʼ of fragile states for 
negotiation of international intervention should be seen as related to Harrisonʼs 
concept ʻsovereign frontiersʼ (Harrison, 2009).  
Westphalian sovereignty becomes the focus of the sovereign frontier and constitutes 
a transboundary space for determining statehood. Elaborating on this point it should 
be reiterated that (Westphalian) sovereignty in fragile states often is used as a 
strategic claim made by political elites, not in order to achieve higher levels of self-
determination, but rather in order to engage in a game of control with donors in 
regards to the pace and scope of reform and access to external finance (Jackson, 
1990).  
It can be argued that in reality this is all the fragile states are able to do due to their 
fragility and the lack of domestic sovereignty. Harrison further argues that fragile 
states have had their outward sovereign frontiers constrained by the liberal demands 
put on them by the international society (Harrison, 2009). The concept of the 
	   56	  
sovereign frontier presupposes a process of subordination and incorporation, and 
sees sovereignty as divided into two indistinct and asymmetrical boundaries – the 
external (outward) and the internal (inward) – that are affected in the meeting 
between state and international society. The outwards boundary is permeable and 
subject to intervention of different agents and is rendered unstable by conflicts over 
political control (Ibid). This process is supported by the largely fictitious domestic 
sovereignty (Jackson, 1990). The inwards boundary on the other hand has a stronger 
boundary of social control and is in turn policed by the international community in 
cases of intervention (Harrison, 2009).  
It is Harrisonʼs claim that the sovereignty of African (fragile) states, has become 
subject to the liberal agenda, and that this is constraining the external frontier of the 
state to the point that it delimits them from becoming equal parties in international 
society. Policy reform and institutional (re)building thus constitutes a process of 
subordination and incorporation, which pushes the outward boundary of the 
sovereign frontier further back into the fragile state and thus limits the political room 
for manoeuvring.  
This establishes an interesting connection to the statebuilding initiatives of the UNʼs 
peacebuilding missions introduced in the following section and proposes an 
expansionary thought process behind the international engagement in fragile states.  
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the nature of the fragile state is instrumental to 
the condition of sovereignty in these countries. The fragile state is, as a consequence 
of its lack of national cohesion, disagreement on the national idea, weak international 
capacity and general ability to provide conditions of security and development unable 
to claim domestic or interdependence sovereignty. The internal instability and 
developmental challenges has in almost all cases, including the three country 
examples, led to international intervention. The fragility is used to attract international 
development aid. International engagement however, comes with conditions of liberal 
reform, which it can be argued, have further constrained the political latitude of the 
states and placed them in a position where the legal aspects of sovereignty are 
evoked in a process of political interaction and negotiation on the scope of 
intervention. Sovereignty in fragile states thus becomes a result of all of its moving 
parts. It is weak due to the internal aspects, but used prominently to negotiate 
conditions for the states continued existence.    
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United Nations Peacebuilding Interventions 
The inclusion of UN peacebuilding in the thesis should be seen in relation to the 
conclusions made above. Due to the fact that the states in question are vulnerable or 
fragile, the sovereignty of these countries has become conditional and a means to 
negotiate assistance for the internal complexities. UN peacebuilding represents this 
negotiation and I believe is helpful in illustrating a condition of sovereignty specific to 
fragile states experiencing peacebuilding interventions. It is thus relevant to note that 
UN peacebuilding missions should be seen in conjunction with condition of the fragile 
state and the negotiating tactics employed by these in the sovereignty game.  
As such the following section should be seen as a means to illustrate the condition of 
sovereignty in fragile states when these are engaged in peacebuilding situations.  
The coming section will start with a brief introduction of the term peacebuilding 
subsequently situating it in a UN context. This serves to introduce the UN as the 
external actor in peacebuilding operations in the three countries used as examples. 
Hereafter I will be attempting to place this within a statebuilding framework that links 
back to the fragile state framework and illustrates UN peacebuildingʼs emersion in 
domestic policy areas. This is done in order to be able to elaborate more thoroughly 
on the connection between the fragile state discussion and peacebuilding 
interventions. Moreover, this allows for further analysis of the implications of UN 
peacebuilding when it comes to fragile stateʼs sovereignty. The point of this is to 
establish the concept of intervention in relation to the framework of the fragile state 
introduced previously, and thus to link the two main sections of the thesis together. 
The subsequent analysis will build on conclusions from the first section of analysis 
while including new perspectives on sovereignty. The discussion seeks to answer the 
research question: 
How do United Nations peacebuilding missions influence the sovereignty of 
fragile states in Africa?  
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Peacebuilding Interventions 
The term peacebuilding arose from the field of peace studies and was coined by 
Johan Galtung in his 1975 essay: ʻThree Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, 
Peacemaking, and Peacebuildingʼ. In the report he stated: “[…] the mechanisms that 
peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for 
the system itself to draw up [...] More specifically, structures must be found that 
remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might 
occur” (Johan Galtung cited in PBI, N.D). Peacebuilding in Galtung optic was thus a 
means to create sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict and 
simultaneously supporting the building of domestic capacities so that peaceful 
conflict resolution could be achieved.  
Defining peacebuilding as a separate area of intervention can be a difficult 
manoeuvre as it is closely linked to notions of statebuilding,5 which focuses on 
building state capacity, and because there are no specific actions taken that 
differentiates it from humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping missions or even 
diplomatic conflict prevention (Andersen, 2010, PBSO, 2010). Peacekeepers for 
instance often work as some of the earliest peacebuilders when they take on tasks 
such as disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration, security sector reform, and 
support to electoral processes and re-establishing governmental authority (DPKO, 
2008). What significantly differentiates peacebuilding from other options to intervene 
is that any peacebuilding activity is undertaken primarily on the merit of whether or 
not it will significantly reduce the risk of conflict (PBSO, 2010). This is not to say that 
peacebuilding has no focus on the developmental aspects of state fragility. It is 
merely that security is emphasised as the main concern for peacebuilding missions. 
It is useful to see peacebuilding as a broader policy framework that strengthens the 
synergy among the related efforts of conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, recovery and development, and as part of a collective and sustained 
effort to build lasting peace (Andersen, 2010). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Statebuilding, as is the case with the fragile state itself, does not have a succinct definition. Most often 
statebuilding is used in one of two ways: to refer to the type of interventions taking place in many fragile 
states or to describe the historic state formation process (Andersen, 2010). The definition used 
throughout this paper is naturally the one concerned with intervention.  
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In recent years developments within the use of the concept of peacebuilding have 
largely been related to the notion of human security (PBI, 2012). Though it is a 
relatively new concept, human security is often used to describe the complex of 
interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of 
peoples (UNDP, 1994, PBI, 2012).6 The focus on human security within the 
peacebuilding framework amounts to a redefinition of traditional understandings of 
security and peace to one, where security is a positive state of being and a feeling of 
being secure. This redefinition of security has to a large degree informed the 
evolution of the understanding of peacebuilding in general and in the UN especially 
(PBI, 2012). As such it can be argued that peacebuilding shows a decided influence 
of liberal ideology and that the concept in itself demonstrates a devaluation of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
A different aspect of peacebuilding is the previously mentioned connection to 
statebuiding activities. This can be directly linked to the evolution within the fragile 
state terminology. As demonstrated previously, the understanding of the fragile state 
has moved from functionality towards performance and the stateʼs ability to perform 
basic functions and provide basic services has become the a more generalised 
understanding within the field (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008). Focus has 
therefore increased on the building of state capacity as a means to create peace.    
Statebuilding is primarily concerned with establishing the national government as the 
highest public authority within its territory and the monopoly provider on security for 
its people. As the UN is the main international actor discussed when analysing 
interventions, it should here be noted that the UN rarely talks of statebuilding, when 
discussing ʻbuilding state capacityʼ, but peacebuilding does indeed include 
statebuilding initiatives: “Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the 
functioning of the state and society. In this regard they seek to enhance the capacity 
of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions” (DPKO, 
2008:18). Though the two terms can be used interchangeable it is important to 
understand that where statebuilding focuses primarily on rebuilding centralised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  .Authors in the field of human security agree that the primary goal is the protection of individuals (Kerr, 
2007). There is some disagreement as to the extent of human security. The ʻnarrowʼ school of thought 
believe that protection only extents to violent threats to individual security. The ʻbroaderʼ school of 
thought holds that individuals also should be protected from hunger, disease, natural disasters and even 
poverty. The broad understanding of human security was first articulated in 1994 in UNDPʼs Human 
Development Report and represents its introduction into common usage in the UN (UNDP, 1994, PBI, 
2012)	  
	   60	  
government, peacebuilding seeks to have a multi-dimensional and comprehensive 
approach and address multiple societal sectors at once (Andersen, 2010). However, 
as the international community sees security as a contingent feature and priority of 
statebuilding, it is easy to see why the UN puts its emphasis on peacebuilding.  
Though the distinction between the two concepts can be seen as primarily heuristic 
in nature, it should be pointed out that in this thesis statebuilding is seen as a 
component within peacebuilding interventions.  
Peacebuilding with its focus on statebuilding and implementation of liberal values 
constitutes an interesting point of focus for analysis on sovereignty in fragile states. 
Peacebuilding illustrates the combination of liberal ideology (democratisation, human 
security, the responsibility to protect) and the belief that rebuilding the state will 
establish security and development long-term, both domestically and internationally.  
 
 
Evolution of UN peacebuilding 
The UN can be seen as the very epicentre for liberal ideology and the understanding 
that security and development are interconnected (Andersen, 2011). The UN is thus 
the obvious focus for examining the influence of international intervention on the 
sovereignty of fragile states and is here introduced as the external actor in 
international intervention. The following is an introduction to the peacebuilding 
framework within a UN context.  
 
The UN has been engaged in peacebuilding efforts since its foundation. Almost all 
UN departments, funds, programmes and agencies as such have a role in delivering 
peacebuilding services to countries in need (DPKO, 2008). The concept however 
saw its initiation into the UN in the early 1990ʼs following the end of the Cold War and 
the rise of the United States as the sole super power.  
The 1990ʼs saw a flare up of intrastate conflicts (many in Sub-Saharan Africa) and 
the UN, which among other things had been established to prevent interstate conflict 
(UN, 1945), saw itself ill equipped to handle the conflict resolution of these internal 
conflicts. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the erstwhile Secretary-General of the UN, therefore 
	   61	  
sought to revise the UNʼs approach to conflict resolution in his 1992 report; ʻAn 
Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeepingʼ. The 
report stated five central goals that the UN should increase its awareness on in order 
to perform better in intrastate conflicts: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and handling the root causes of conflict (UNSG, 1992). 
The report sees the first use of the concept of peacebuilding in a UN context and 
represents a focus on the (re)building of states in order to establish lasting peace. 
This report also demonstrated a shift towards the UN focusing on creating lasting 
peace by tackling the conflictsʼ root causes such as economic destitution, social 
injustice, poverty and political oppression. Moreover, this report can be seen as 
indicative of a newfound focus on liberal ideology.  
The 1992 report introduced a revised focus in conflict resolution, which has allowed 
the UN to establish itself as a prominent player in both conflict mediation and in 
(re)building countries after the end of the armed conflict (Andersen, 2007).  
The point of relevance in relation to this thesisʼ focus on sovereignty is the shift that 
then occurred in the UNʼs peace seeking approaches and the consequences this has 
had for the UNʼs intervention area. It can be argued that the shift illustrates the 
expansion of the Westʼs project to intervene in fragile countries and that the report 
demonstrates the beginning of a decline in seeing sovereignty as an absolute notion.   
In 1998 the report ʻThe Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africaʼ by the erstwhile Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
was published. At this point the UN had been present in a number of African intra-
state conflicts using the principles set forth by Boutros-Ghali in 1992. According to 
Annan, it was time to develop a new set of directives, which should inform the 
interventions of the UN in conflicts in Africa in the immediate future. It was his 
intention to emphasise a number of general guidelines and that each mission 
thereafter should be customised to fit each specific conflict situation using these 
principles.  
The report specifically identified a number of causes for conflict on the African 
continent and focused on statebuilding and democratisation as the main elements in 
successful conflict resolution (UNSG, 1998). The report further focused on the fact 
that there was a high number of a specific type of conflict in Africa. Not only where 
the conflicts in Africa of an intrastate character, but the conflicts had also moved 
away from demanding its majority of victims among the soldiers or combatants and 
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now claimed its victims primarily among civilians (UNSG, 1998). The Secretary-
General subsequently concluded that the ultimate goal for the UNʼs peace missions 
should be to safeguard civilians (UNSG, 1998:art. 3). This demonstrates the UNʼs 
shift away from a state-centric understanding of security and an increased focus on 
human security. Furthermore, statebuilding is here introduced as an element fit for 
international intervention. 
The two reports demonstrate a focus on human security, democratisation, and the 
building of sound institutions when establishing peace. The area of intervention is 
widened to include domestic policy areas, which had not previously been the purview 
of international engagement. It can be argued that both of these reports have been 
instrumental in establishing a foundation for peacebuilding and a greater focus on 
seeking human security and development through statebuilding than adhering to 
conventional understandings of legal sovereignty.  
 
Building state capacity 
Though the security-development discourse and democratisation are still evident 
within the peacebuilding agenda it has been supplemented by a focus on the building 
of state capacity. This discussion links back to the conceptualisation of the fragile 
state and highlights the evolution of the concept over the last 20 years. This 
essentially demonstrates an understanding that statehood is effective not juridical 
and that states can be constructed and are not a pre-existing fact. Furthermore, this 
illustrates the fact that the UN now to a large degree has made itself responsible for 
the statebuilding project in fragile states. Domestic policy areas are now included in 
the framework for peacebuilding interventions and building state capacity has grown 
to be seen as the foundation for security and development (UNSG, 2009).  
Peacebuilding missions have thus in the last decade seen an increased focus on 
statebuilding as a contingent feature of establishing sustainable peace and security 
(Andersen, 2010). This follows as a result of the understanding that state fragility and 
intrastate conflict often are a result of weak institutions, lack of national cohesion and 
social disparity. This understanding is accompanied by the theory that to escape the 
circle of conflict and “underdevelopment”, the institutional capacity of the state must 
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be improved to the point where they are able to perform the basic functions of the 
state and deliver essential services (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). The notion that the 
modern state has a duty to fulfil a certain number of functions is implicit within the 
state fragility discussion. This attitude is largely underpinned by the modern 
understanding of the state, as described previously. The purpose of the statebuilding 
project is thus to ensure that the fragile state is able to fulfil these functions 
(Andersen, 2011). 
It should here be mentioned in relation to this that the building of state capacity in 
fragile states often is seen directly in the image of the idealised modern state 
(Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008). It can be argued that this in reality is an 
unrealistic notion, which goes back to the very conceptualisation of the state fragility 
term and the weak/strong state understanding. The fragile state is ʻweakʼ due to a 
lack of state capacity and thus must be rebuilt in order to become a strong state, 
which can assume all the functions for statehood. States are here seen as following a 
set trajectory, which inevitably ends in the modern state category (Mcloughlin, 2012).  
It is my argument that this understanding neglects looking at the historic/cultural 
context. Furthermore, casting the fragile state in the image of the modern ʻwesternʼ 
state presupposes a large degree of intervention in domestic policy areas and a 
disregard of both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. As such the 
statebuilding process is an inherently political project (Andersen, 2008).  
External actors, such as the UN, however sometimes overlook values, interests and 
perceptions and primarily focus on the sequencing and timing of the process 
(Andersen, 2010).  
In the context of the fragile state and the UNʼs peacebuilding interventions, 
statebuilding has become an innately international engagement where outsiders 
influence the structure and format of the state that is to be rebuilt. The peacebuilding 
approach implies that the international community has become deeply engaged in 
the (re)construction of the domestic outlook of the state that is to be built. The reality 
is that the international community and the UN often functions as a stand-in state 
while performing the reconstruction (Andersen, 2010). In actuality this means that the 
UN often takes part in lengthy and multilevel interventions that require their presence 
in order to uphold some degree of domestic sovereignty while building the national 
capacity that is seen as necessary (Hellema, 2008).  
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The UN, with its mandate for and focus on peacebuilding, has thus largely made 
itself responsible for statebuilding in fragile states and for generating lasting peace 
and development.  
To consolidate the focus on peacebuilding activities, the UN in 2005-2006 
established a peacebuilding architecture consisting of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office (Friborg and 
Andersen, 2006). The main goal of the peacebuilding architecture is to provide 
synergy and persistence in peace missions while simultaneously integrating 
comprehensive strategies for peacebuilding and securing long-term financial support 
(UNSG, 2005). Peacebuilding has today grown to involve a wide range of measures 
targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening 
national capacities in all levels of conflict management, and by laying the foundation 
for sustainable security and development (DPKO, 2008:18).  
It can be argued that UN peacebuilding interventions demonstrate an expansive area 
of intervention and that they constitutes a type of international intervention that has 
moved beyond the interaction phase of fragile stateʼs sovereignty. The UN, with its 
liberal ideology and the incentive of the security-development nexus, has become 
deeply engaged in the (re)building of fragile states and have become at least partially 
responsible for the de facto sovereignty of the fragile states it functions within. This 
outside engagement in legally sovereign states begs the question; how is the 
sovereignty of these countries influenced by these interventions?  
 
Fragile stateʼs sovereignty in UN Peacebuilding Missions 
The following section will elaborate on the implementation of peacebuilding in fragile 
states using the three previously described countries as examples. The following also 
outlines Stephen Krasnerʼs perception of sovereignty in the interplay between the 
fragile state and the international community. Arguments made throughout the thesis 
will furthermore be used in order to perform a nuanced analysis and draw 
conclusions on the research question.   
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Contained within the UNʼs peacebuilding approach is the understanding that the state 
is a prerequisite for creating and maintaining peace. Ergo a strong state is a 
legitimate state, which has the capacity to perform the required functions, and has 
the support of the population. Statehood thus continues to be seen as the only 
legitimate institution in international relation (Krasner, 2009). The state is therefore 
also a prerequisite for peacebuilding operations to take place to begin with. The UN 
continues to be dependent on agreement from the governing party of a country in 
order to take any intervention. As such even a fragile state must be validated in order 
for the UN to gain entry and thus begin statebuilding initiatives (Andersen, 2007).  
As the UN has undergone an evolution in its peacebuilding activities it has, as 
mentioned previously, somewhat changed its position on which principles of 
international relations holds more sway. Sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention, which previously were the undisputed and unbreakable principles of 
international law, have somewhat decreased in value as the humanitarian 
imperatives that Boutros-Ghali and Annan championed have gained influence. This 
illustrates the fact that the de jure part of sovereignty has decreased in importance, 
or at least changed meaning from right to responsibility. It can be argued that this to 
some degree demonstrates a shift in prioritisation of the dimensions of sovereignty, 
at least seen from the UNʼs point of view.  
This is further exemplified by the focus on statebuilding and capacity generation, 
which can be seen as traditional domestic policy areas. UN peacebuilding essentially 
focuses on creating/facilitating de facto sovereignty by building the state. Making the 
fragile state able to perform the basic functions and deliver essential services in 
effect create better conditions for development and security and thus improve the 
domestic aspects of sovereignty. The paradoxical aspect in this regard is the fact 
that, when it comes to the fragile state and UN peacebuilding, the improvement of 
domestic sovereignty requires the violation of Westphalian sovereignty. The meeting 
between the fragile state and the UN in the shape of peacebuilding can thus be seen 
as a double edged sword simultaneously helping to create one kind of sovereignty 
while decrease another.  
 
To be able to discuss the implications of the UNʼs peacebuilding interventions on the 
sovereignty of fragile states it is relevant to add a brief elucidation of the UNʼs 
engagement in the three country examples: Burundi, the Central African Republic, 
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and Sierra Leone. During the following analysis of the UNʼs peacebuilding approach, 
I will be drawing on examples from these three countries while including theoretical 
perspectives.	  	  
Burundi 
In June 2004 the United Nations took over peacekeeping duties from the African 
Union (BBC, 2012b). The following year Burundi, alongside Sierra Leone, became 
the first country to receive financial support from the newly founded Peacebuilding 
Fund. (Campell et al, 2010). In 2007 the UN shut down its peacekeeping mission and 
refocused its operations on helping with reconstruction (BBC, 2012b). The United 
Nations Integrated Office in Burundi was established in the same year and the 
ʻStrategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundiʼ produced. The SFPBB identified 
the following target areas: Sound management of resources; guaranteed security of 
person and property; institutional stability and effective governmental action; reduced 
security expenditure and professionalization of the security forces; compliance with 
the rules of good economic and political governance by the public authorities; the 
transparent management of public business and increased absorption capacity 
(UNPBC, 2007A). 
Current priority areas include: Promotion of good governance; comprehensive 
Ceasefire Agreement between Government of Burundi and rebel groups; security 
sector reform; justice; rule of law; promotion of human rights and action to combat 
impunity; the land issue and socio-economic recovery; mobilisation and coordination 
of international assistance; gender; consolidation of democracy and dialogue; 
support to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and socio-economic 
reintegration of the vulnerable groups; regional integration (PBSO, ND). 
 
The Central African Republic 
In 1998 the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission to assist in maintaining and 
enhancing security and stability in the capital Bangui and the surrounding area (BBC, 
2011b). They were to supervise and monitor the disposition of weapons from 
disarmament exercises; assist in capacity-building of national security; provide 
advice and technical support for legislative elections. In 2000, the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) was 
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established and given mandate to provide assistance in the peacebuilding effort. 
BONUCA assists in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, strengthening 
democratic institutions and facilitating the mobilisation of political support and 
resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery in the country (CAR, 
N.D). In 2009 UN further authorised a peacekeeping mission to be deployed to the 
Central African Republic in order to protect civilians from violence spilling over from 
the Darfur region of Sudan (BBC, 2011a). ʻThe Strategic Framework for 
Peacebuilding in the Central African Republicʼ  was produced in 2009 and focuses 
on: re-establishing state authority; security sector reform; revitalisation of the 
economy; reconstruction of infrastructure; strengthening the states ability to provide 
basic services and investment in human capital (UNPBC, 2009A). 
Current priorities areas include: Reform of the security sector and disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration; governance; rule of law; human rights and 
development hubs (PBSO, N.D). 
 
Sierra Leone 
The UNʼs first mission to Sierra Leone was deployed in 1998 in the shape of 
monitoring and advisory personal. The following year UN peacekeepers were 
deployed as part of the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNASIL) (UNIPSIL, 
N.D). It was however not until 2001 that UN troops where able to deploy peacefully in 
rebel-held territory. At this time there are more that 17.500 troops and personal in the 
area (UNIPSIL, N.D). The majority of peacekeepers left Sierra Leone in 2005 (BBC, 
2012d). The same year the focus of UN engagement changed from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding with the establishment of a peacebuilding office in the country. In 2007 
the ʻSierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Frameworkʼ was produced. The 
framework focuses on: Youth employment and empowerment; justice and security 
sector reform; rule of law; consolidation of democracy; good governance and 
capacity building (UNPBC, 2007b). In 2008, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding 
Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) began its work, providing political advice to foster 
peace and political consolidation, offering support and training to the national police 
and security forces, and building the capacity of democratic institutions in effort to 
further good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights (UNIPSIL, 
N.D). 
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Current priority areas include: Youth employment and empowerment; justice and 
security sector reform; consolidation of democracy and good governance; capacity-
building; energy sector; sub-regional dimensions of peacebuilding; tackling drug 
trafficking (PBSO, N.D). 
 
The review of the UNʼs interventions in the three fragile states shows the recent 
focus on statebuilding activities as well as the long-term nature of the commitment. 
The priorities of the UN in peacebuilding operations have been elaborated on in the 
report from 2009 ʻReport of the Secretary‐General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflictʼ. The report provides a widely accepted standard list 
of activities that are believed relevant to creating sustainable security and 
development in fragile states: support basic safety and security, support political 
processes, support the provision of basic services, support the restoration of core 
government functions, and support economic revitalisation (UNSG, 2009). All of 
these elements are evident in the three countriesʼ ʻStrategic frameworks for 
Peacebuildingʼ  (UNPBC, 2007A, UNPBC, 2009A and UNPBC, 2007b). These areas 
of priority span across development, security and human rights incentives and 
demonstrate the UNʼs belief in the interrelated nature of peacebuilding and the 
importance of building state capacity. It can be argued that this furthermore, 
demonstrates a shift in relation to adherence to generally accepted options to 
intervene. Peacebuilding can be seen as large-scale engagement in domestic policy 
areas and often a long-term process of intervention. 
Presently there are only two generally accepted policy options for dealing with fragile 
states: governance assistance (support to development efforts, assistance for 
improvement of the capabilities of government institutions and authority, and support 
for a limited number of policies) and in rare cases, short term transitional 
administration (assuming short-term administration of a territory in order to re-
establish peace). These two policy options do not directly violate the external (de 
jure) parameters of sovereignty if the intervening party is restricted from gaining too 
much influence in domestic policy creation and execution (Krasner, 2004). Harrison 
does however argue, that especially governance interventions have a tendency to 
continuously overlap and thus becoming long-term arrangements binding the fragile 
states ability to act (Harrison, 2009).  
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UN peacebuilding should be seen in relation to this as these interventions often 
follow other options of intervention, both governance and peacekeeping.  
It can be argued that UN peacebuilding in all of the cases above have succeeded 
(and run parallel to) governance interventions from a number of international 
organisations and bilateral donors, and as such are part of a long-term process of 
over-determination of external actors. Over-determination should here be understood 
in relation to the conditionality of international assistance and the required 
governance reforms that accompany peacebuilding interventions.  
The focus on statebuilding and capacity improvement means that the UN is heavily 
entrenched in domestic sovereignty areas, which traditionally are not areas of 
international intervention (Krasner, 2004). The UN has as such made itself partly 
responsible for the performance of the state.  
As argued in the first section of analysis, sovereignty in fragile states has become a 
matter of interaction with external actors. UN peacebuilding illustrates the degree to 
which international intervention is accepted in pursuit of external finances and 
domestic control. It is my belief that peacebuilding interventions have moved beyond 
conventionally accepted options to intervene and has moved on to become a form of 
shared sovereignty. 
 
Shared sovereignty arrangements are long-term arrangements where the fragile 
state shares administration with an external actor in order to thoroughly build up the 
domestic aspects of sovereignty (Krasner, 2004). Such arrangement includes signing 
away a certain degree of self-determination and Westphalian sovereignty for the 
fragile state involved. Though the fragile states above have not contractually signed 
over their Westphalian sovereignty, it is evident that they all have become 
accountable to external actors in order to gain access to development aid and 
peacebuilding resources. This should be seen in relation to the argument, made in 
the previous section regarding fragile stateʼs sovereignty. Sovereignty in these 
countries is used as a resource for negotiation with international actors. On the one 
hand legal sovereignty is jealously guarded and evoked whenever there is fear of 
imperialistic intentions. On the other hand the condition of the fragile state has made 
it necessary for the ruling parties to engage with international parties for resources 
and domestic control.  
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It is therefore my argument that peacebuilding interventions in many cases can be 
seen as examples of sovereignty sharing. In both the Central African Republic and 
Sierra Leone, the UN has been present in some intervening capacity since 1998, and 
in Burundi since 2004. In these cases the UN can be assumed to have succeeded 
financial and governance reforms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank and 
others and have become the last link in a long chain of external interventions.  
All three countries have created Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding in 
cooperation with the UN and thus agreed to formalise their commitment to the 
ideology of the UN. Though this is not to say that the countries necessarily follow the 
framework, it can be argued that this places the three countries under near constant 
over-determination by an external actor.  
 
The incentive to enter into such arrangements of shared sovereignty should thus 
again be seen in relation to the character of the fragile state and comes down to the 
likelihood of positive and profitable outcomes for the country (and also partly the 
international actor/organisation/donor) involved. In essence, it comes down to the 
ruling parties of the states seeking to retain some degree of sovereignty. Krasner 
sees four reasons for fragile states to enter into such agreements: avarice (greed), 
post-conflict occupation, desperation and elections (Krasner, 2004). It should be 
noted that in the following not all of the above mentioned fragile states are used as 
examples of the different incentive structures. This is not to say that all of the 
countries cannot have had all of the incentives listed, but merely that a specific 
incentive is more evident than another, or that one state displays an incentive more 
prominently than another. 
 
Avarice: Countries with a high degree of natural resources, such as oil, minerals, 
diamonds or precious metals are prone to engage in sovereignty sharing schemes if 
they are unlikely to gain access to revenues otherwise (Ibid).  
As mentioned previously in the preliminary description of Sierra Leone, the countryʼs 
natural resources (especially the diamonds) have played a large role in fuelling the 
conflict both domestically and in neighbouring Liberia (BBC, 2012c). As a result of 
this and the criminalisation of the extraction industry in general, the UN in 2000 
placed a ban on the so-called blood diamonds from the country (Krasner, 2004). The 
government of Sierra Leone can be seen as having capitalised on allowing an 
UN/ECOWAS intervention to take place, by re-establish their authority in the 
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diamond areas and legitimise the industry. The UN consequently lifted its ban on 
blood diamonds in 2003 (New York Times, 2003).  
Though no formal shared sovereignty agreement has been signed in the case of 
Sierra Leone, it is evident that agreeing to external intervention has allowed the state 
to gain access to an area of income from which the state was barred previously. The 
country was also under sanctions on petroleum products and arms at the time, and it 
can only be speculated that the prospect of having these sanctions lifted served as 
further incentive to allow UN/ECOWAS troops into the country (BBC, 2012b). As 
such it can be argued that Westphalian sovereignty in Sierra Leone, to a degree has 
been sacrificed in an effort to secure financial profit and gain back trading rights over 
resources barred on the international market.  
 
Post-conflict occupation: The presence of non-national military personal in a country 
coming out of violent conflict might be conducive to shared sovereignty arrangements 
as the national government in some cases is dependent on non-nationals to preserve 
peace and stay in power (Krasner, 2004).  
In the case of the peacebuilding interventions exemplified in this thesis, this can be 
said to be true in all of the countries at one point or another. In Sierra Leone the UN 
and ECOWAS at one point had 17.500 troops in the country creating and maintaining 
peace, disarming and demobilising troops. One could argue that the government in 
this case was forced into a sovereignty sharing arrangement in order to maintain 
peace and even stay in power.  
This is likewise demonstrated in the Central African Republic, where the weakness of 
the stateʼs authority outside the capital and the surrounding area is virtually absent. It 
can be argued that the Central African Republic has been forced to rely on 
international engagement in order to establish any semblance of peace in the 
country. The Central African Republic also suffers from non-national insurgents from 
neighbouring conflicts generating violence in areas outside the stateʼs control.  
The incentive for allowing the UN into the Central African Republic can thus be seen 
both in relation to the weak authority of the state itself and in relation to the regional 
instability. The state is unable to control its own territory and thus lacks domestic 
sovereignty, but it also lacks the ability to control the independence aspect of 
sovereignty and prevent the crossing of both refugees and rebels across its borders. 
International intervention thus becomes the lesser of two evils.  
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It can even be argued that international intervention in the shape of peacebuilding in 
a case such as this will be instrumental in extending the authority area of the state 
outside of the capital in the long-term. Short-term sovereignty sharing and 
relinquishing of Westphalian sovereignty thus become the preferable option.  
 
The question however become whether or not such peacebuilding interventions are 
actually short-term engagements? The UN has currently been present in both 
countries for more than 14 years. In both of these countries the UN extended their 
initial peacekeeping missions into peacebuilding initiatives essentially creating a 
process of consecutive interventions dealing with the very nature of fragile statehood. 
The UN has thus become entrenched in the statebuilding project and the states have 
become dependent on the assistance. It can thus be argued that the fragile states 
have ʻusedʼ their adverse circumstances to gain access to international assistance, 
both developmental and militarily, but that this in essence have placed them under a 
long-term over-determination by these same external donors.   
  
Desperation: Countries suffering from long-term economic destitution and recurring 
civil conflict, while having no easily exploited natural resources might be desperate to 
gain access to external resources and thus be interested in sharing sovereignty 
(Krasner, 2004). Krasner further notes that in such cases the state has very little 
bargaining power and external actors will be able to negotiate agreements fairly 
easily. The main downside to these arrangements for the external actor is that such 
arrangements are fairly costly (ibid). 
All of the fragile states mentioned above can be seen as fitting into this category, but 
it is perhaps most evident in Burundi and the Central African Republic. Both of these 
countries are listed among the worldʼs poorest countries (BBC, 2012a and BBC, 
2011a) and are struggling to revitalise and diversify their economies in the aftermath 
of large-scale conflict (UNPBC, 2007A and UNPBC, 2009A). Both countries have 
been struggling with political unrest and failing economies since independence and 
have subsequently been provided with international development assistance 
throughout the period. Both countries have been subject to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPʼs)7 in the 1980ʼs and governance reforms in the early 1990ʼs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPʼs) are the name for the policies implemented by the World 
Bank and the IMF, when lending money to developing countries. The programmes where particularly 
used in the 1980ʼs and came with conditionalities of market liberalisation and roll back of the state 
(Szirmai, 2005) 
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(EoN, N.Da and EoN, N.Db). As political unrest grew into large-scale conflict in both 
countries during the 1990ʼs, the UNʼs peacekeeping and then peacebuilding have 
taken over. This can be seen as an example of countries coming under a near 
constant over-determination by external actors. Furthermore, I believe that this is 
indicative of the sovereignty sharing arrangement that UN peacebuilding constitutes 
today.  
 
Elections:  This relates primarily to fragile states under the heading of illiberal 
democracy or other similar names. Shared sovereignty might in these cases be an 
attractive platform for candidates running for government, who struggle to make their 
political claims credible in an environment of unconsolidated democracy (Krasner, 
2004).  
Burundi can be seen as an example of this kind of incentive structure. The country 
has been experiencing civil war and ethnic-fuelled political unrest since the early 
1970ʼs and only signed a peace accord with the last remaining rebel group in 2008 
(BBC, 2012b). The fragile state saw renewed ethnic tension after the election in 2010 
and it has been argued by organisations such as Human Rights Watch that the sitting 
government is becoming increasingly authoritarian (HRW, 2012). In this environment 
the presence of a UN peacebuilding mission could be seen as political resource for 
stability and potentially be used as a political platform for consolidating political rule. 
It can be argued that the UN was allowed to take over an already existing 
intervention by the African Union, and start peacebuilding initiatives such 
democratisation and elections, in an effort to consolidate power. The reality is that 
Burundians have agreed to a power sharing constitution, which allows for both 
factions (Hutu and Tutsi) to gain access to political power (BBC, 2012b). Though this 
might not have consolidated democracy to the degree that is was hoped, it is 
indicative of opposing groups grabbing hold of as much power as is available to 
them. The UNʼs peacebuilding mission can be seen as being part of creating this 
arrangement and thus having influenced domestic authority structures. It is my 
argument that, whether or not there is talk of a decidedly sovereignty sharing 
arrangement on these grounds, the peacebuilding intervention in Burundi should be 
seen in relation to the possibility to consolidate power.  
 
The four types of incentives structures illustrated above, using the country examples, 
all show the push/pull effect of sovereignty negotiation in relation to fragile states. 
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The fragile state pulls on external actors in order to gain access to resources, while 
the external actor (here the UN) push to gain admittance to statebuilding and 
peacebuilding.  
What should be noted in relation to UN peacebuilding is that the negotiation seems to 
be uneven in terms of strength. Though fragile states have a definite impact on the 
peacebuilding intervention, through international legal sovereignty and the principle 
of non-intervention contained within Westphalian sovereignty, the condition of fragility 
and the lack of domestic and interdependence sovereignty place the countries in 
relatively weak positions to negotiate. UN peacebuilding operations on the other 
hand represent access to external resources and the possibility of increased 
authority and domestic sovereignty in the long-term. The surrender of Westphalian 
sovereignty thus seems a short-term sacrifice in order to gain long-term benefits. 
UN peacebuilding should however be seen in relation to the fact that operations often 
act as an extension of previous international interventions (peacekeeping, 
governance or financial), and thus build on already existing arrangements of 
subordination and cooperation. As such UN peacebuilding can be seen as just 
another push on the outward sovereign frontier of the fragile state and an instrument 
for delimiting fragile statesʼ sovereignty further. UN peacebuilding operations, without 
a doubt, stand in a much stronger position for negotiating sovereignty and can thus 
be seen as having placed sovereignty in fragile states under a higher degree of 
pressure. It is my argument that UN peacebuilding interventions in fragile states can 
be seen as shared sovereignty agreements due to the fact that the state is ʻforcedʼ by 
circumstance to relinquish Westphalian sovereignty for an extended period of time. It 
can be argued that UN peacebuilding of itself does not constitute a long-term shared 
sovereignty commitment, but as peacebuilding can be seen as the representation of 
UN ideology and governance reform it is indicative of a longer process of over-
determination.    
Summarising on the abovementioned it can be argued that UN peacebuilding, with its 
focus on human security, responsibility to protect and statebuilding has positioned 
itself in a prominent position in the negotiation of sovereignty with fragile states. The 
charactor of the fragile state alongside the fact that peacebuilding often succeeds 
other external interventions and follows immediately after the end of civil conflict, 
means that the fragile state is positioned relatively weakly in the negotiation of 
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sovereignty. The lack of domestic and interdependence sovereignty also adds to the 
incentives of fragile states to engage in and allow international intervention. It can be 
argued that the desire for de facto sovereignty overrides the one to maintain sole 
custody of Westphalian sovereignty and non-intervention. It can thus be argued that 
UN peacebuilding interventions have an adverse impact on Westphalian sovereignty 
at least on the short to medium-term. It can thus be argued that the main incentive for 
fragile states to engage in shared sovereignty arrangements with UN peacebuilding 
operations is that some sovereignty in the short term is better than none and that the 
intervention in domestic policy areas might lead to increased sovereignty in the 
future. The fragile states are thus left with only using their Westphalian sovereignty to 
influence the pace and scope of the intervention and not as such for gaining more 
authority and self-determination. 
As such the character of the fragile state can be seen as having a prominent impact 
on the condition of sovereignty in fragile states experiencing UN peacebuilding 
interventions. This illustrates the interconnected nature of the character of the fragile 
state, UN peacebuilding and the field of interaction that is sovereignty. It is therefore 
my conclusion that UN peacebuilding in as well as the character of the fragile state 
have position fragile states in informal arrangements of shared sovereignty.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion it can be said that the character of the fragile state is of paramount 
importance to the condition of sovereignty. The lack of national coherence, 
institutional capacity, ability to control territory and monopoly of violence and the 
general lack of ability to provide the conditions for development and security means 
that the fragile state holds virtually no domestic or interdependence sovereignty. In 
an international community where the connection between security and development 
have gained prominence in recent years and where human security has become a 
relevant reason to intervene, fragile states have gained international attention.  
In this environment the fragile state has grown to become a new kind of sovereign 
state that is independent in law, insubstantial in reality and hugely materially 
dependent on other states for general functions and welfare. This has lead to a 
situation where the adverse circumstances of the state and the very lack of domestic 
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sovereignty are used as instruments for attracting external resources and for staking 
claims to sovereignty.  
This however means that the conventional understanding of legal sovereignty in 
international relations and the principle of non-intervention have come into question. 
As such de jure sovereignty, especially Westphalian sovereignty, have become 
entities for negotiation of the pace and scope of the external intervention and not, as 
previously believed, indisputable principles of international relations. Sovereignty in 
fragile states can thus be seen as a matter of interaction rather than an absolute and 
indisputable fact of international relations as previously understood. 
 
UN peacebuilding interventions are seen in relation to this field of sovereignty 
negotiation and are in this thesis understood to be the representation of the 
international communities focus on security and development. UN peacebuilding with 
its added dimension of statebuilding illustrates an added dimension to the 
understanding of sovereignty as interaction and sets sovereignty in fragile states 
within the framework of shared sovereignty. It is evident in the nature of the fragile 
state alongside the statebuilding focus of UN peacebuilding interventions have 
created a situation where fragile states have entered into informal arrangements of 
shared sovereignty in order to gain access to resources and potentially (re)gain 
control over their territory. 
 
UN peacebuilding can in this way be seen to negate sovereignty in fragile states in 
the short to medium term, and to decrease the scope, latitude and policy options of 
the fragile state. However if the peacebuilding project is successful and then 
withdraws from the fragile state, the shared sovereignty arrangement in the long run 
has the potential to increase domestic and interdependence sovereignty. 	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